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**MCWP 3-33.1**  
***MAGTF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS***

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## FORWARD

The battlefield has become an increasingly complex and crowded place. Accordingly, civil-military operations have become an integral element of military operations. The intersections between the military and the civilian populace have consequences that can defeat operational plans and must be carefully considered. Carefully planned, coordinated, and executed civil military operations can help the MAGTF win by shaping the battlespace, enhancing freedom of action, isolating the enemy, meeting our moral obligations to civilians, and providing access to additional capabilities. At its simplest, civil military operations reduce friction that may disrupt MAGTF operations.

Civil-military considerations present opportunities as well as dangers. The effective use of civil-military operations can create a positive climate for military activities while adding to the dilemma we create for our adversaries. As an economy of force measure, civil-military operations can expand the MAGTF commander's area of influence. It enhances our ability to shape the entire battlespace. Civil-military operations support the accomplishment of the MAGTF mission. Civil-military operations create conditions for successful conflict resolution and the transition back to peaceful civilian administration. Ultimately, civil-military operations are tools the commander can use to prevent conflict, support civil authorities, win battles, and secure peace.

This warfighting publication presents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the planning, coordination, and execution of civil-military operations across the full spectrum of military operations. It establishes a framework for analysis, decision, and action. This framework builds on the principles established in MCDP 1, *Warfighting*. This publication is consistent with joint guidance while focusing on the MAGTF application of civil-military operations.

## I. The Civil Dimension of Military Operations

"The policy aims that are the motive for any group in war should also be the foremost determinants of its conduct. The single most important thought to understand is that war *must serve policy*."

- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

### **Military Operations and Civil Considerations**

Military operations are one of the practical methods with which we pursue our nation's policy objectives. These actions take place to prevent conflict, support civil authorities, win wars, and secure peace. Military operations involve more than the simple application of forces, arms, and equipment. Each operation also has a civil dimension. This dimension includes people in the area of operations, within the region, around the world, and within our own nation. The civil dimension requires that commanders consider how their actions affect, and are affected by, the broad presence of non-combatants. As Clausewitz wrote, "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes." We cannot ignore the civil dimension of military operations.

Civil-military operations are applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Marines are deployed across the globe to support regional engagement strategies designed to further U.S. national goals through the forward presence of expeditionary units. Other Marines are involved in multi-national training activities and exercises that contribute to international cooperation and stability. U.S. forces respond to complex emergencies, such as natural disasters, that overwhelm civil authorities. Marines contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and are prepared to employ force and the threat of force to deter conflict. If our efforts to preserve peace fail, we employ carefully focused military capability to accomplish national objectives as swiftly and with as little loss of life as is possible. Once hostilities are concluded, our forces contribute to stabilization, recovery, and to the peaceful transition of control back to civil authorities.

In every case we will operate in close contact with civilians and their governments. We will need to carefully create, nurture, and maintain positive relations between ourselves and the people, governments, and nongovernmental organizations in our area of operations. The activities that the commander undertakes in order to create and foster positive relations between military forces and civilians are known as Civil-Military Operations. Effective civil-military operations further national goals, help military commanders meet their international obligations to civilians, and enhance the effective use of combat power.

### **Civil-Military Operations defined**

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) describes all of the activities that the commander undertakes to establish and maintain relations between civilians and the MAGTF in order to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission. Effective CMO maximizes support for, and minimizes civilian interference with, the mission. There is a CMO component to each and every military operation, although the MAGTF resources devoted to CMO will

vary with regard to particular operations and throughout various phases of the operation. CMO does not only refer to operations in which the MAGTF provides support or services to civilians or their governments such as Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Relief efforts. CMO is conducted to facilitate military operations, achieve military operational objectives, and satisfy U.S. policy goals.

**Civil-Military Operations:**

“The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.”

- Joint Pub 1-02 *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

CMO supports all MAGTF operations across the spectrum of conflict. CMO may be employed as an economy of force measure, one that applies limited assets to prevent or solve operational problems and which obtains benefits that outweigh the costs. Successful management of relations between the MAGTF and the wide variety of civilians on the modern battlefield, helps to effectively shape the battlespace. CMO facilitates MAGTF operations, limits the adversary’s freedom of action, and helps establish conditions for crisis resolution.

## **Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs Forces, and Civil Affairs Activities**

Civil Affairs (CA) is a term that is used only to describe designated personnel and distinct units. Civil affairs is neither a mission nor an objective, but the name of a particular force that helps the MAGTF commander to conduct civil-military operations. CA forces help bring expertise, that is not normally available, to the MAGTF. CA forces are organized and equipped specifically to support CMO and to conduct civil affairs activities. Civil affairs activities are those which embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, and which involve the application of particular skills normally the responsibility of civil government. These responsibilities might include Public Administration, Public Health, Economic Development, and Utilities.

**Civil Affairs:**

"Civil Affairs describes designated active and reserve forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA"

- Joint Pub 1-02 *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Civil military operations describe the efforts made to build and use associations with civilian people and groups to facilitate operational tasks across the full range of military operations. Every element of the MAGTF may participate in the planning and execution of civil military operations. Whether a Marine is an operational planner dealing with a member of a foreign government, a member of a civil affairs unit working with an international relief organization, or a rifleman at a checkpoint talking with a local farmer, that Marine is conducting CMO. CMO is a constant element throughout the planning and execution of military operations, and not merely an adjunct specialty that occurs before or after hostilities. CA activities, however, are distinguishable from CMO to the extent that civil affairs activities are characterized by the application of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of the local government or civil authority. Civil affairs forces help the MAGTF do this.

## **Challenge of Modern Operations**

It is difficult to predict what missions Marines will be assigned tomorrow. However, we can consider the factors that are likely to be part of any operation.

### **We Will Act in the National Interest**

Our operations will be in the national interest. Whether demonstrating national commitment through forward presence, , exercising with allies and strategic partners, engaged in armed combat, or providing relief to victims of natural catastrophe, we support our nations objectives and policies.

### **We Will Serve In Expeditionary Environments**

We will operate far from home. The requirements of Major Theater War (MTW), a Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC), or important theater engagement missions demands that we operate in varied locations that may not be accustomed or adapted to U.S. military presence. Wherever we deploy, we will interact with civilians and civilian organizations.

### **Our US Force Will Have New Team Members**

We will have many partners, and many of them will not wear uniforms. We will work with other Services, including Active, Reserve, and Guard members. Increasingly, we will work with representatives of various U.S. government (USG), international organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with capabilities and expertise usually not found in the MAGTF. Other Government Agencies (OGAs) might include diplomats and Foreign Service personnel or country team personnel of the

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Department of State (DOS), disaster relief specialists from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), international development specialists from the Agency for International Development (USAID), or public health experts from the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Most challenging, many of these partners will not fall under our direct command. They will understand problems from their own perspective and seek to resolve them in a manner they think fit, but often without any obligation to accept our direction. Many NGOs and OGAs may not have worked together before and few if any will be subordinate to a military commander. NATO forces may be preparing for CMO under their concept of Civil-Military Cooperations (CIMIC). Extraordinary measures will be required to establish a unified effort.

“ In short, more and more U.S. military men and women are going to be involved in vague, confusing military actions, heavily overlaid with political, humanitarian, and economic considerations.”  
- Gen A. C. Zinni, USMC


### **We Will Be Watched By The World**

Our efforts will be observed, commented upon, and selectively portrayed to a world audience. Our actions will be perceived differently by many viewers who will not necessarily be unbiased. The perceptions created by our operations will result in changes to political realities that may, in turn, affect our assigned mission. CMO has a powerful Information Operations component. Not only our actions matter, but the perceptions that our actions create matter.

### **We Will Need Strategic Corporals**

Small, apparently local actions may have strategic consequences. An event at a single checkpoint may change the relationship between the MAGTF, local residents, allied partners, NGOs, or public opinion. All Marines must be aware of their strategic responsibilities.

### **We Will Fight Alongside Allies**

Our operations will likely involve the forces of other nations in a coalition or combined effort.  allies will have different capabilities, equipment, procedures, and values. Their values will rarely be identical to our own. Our operations must carefully consider the implications of actions taken by members of the combined force.


### **Civilians May be Objectives and Targets**

Civilians are a part of the battlefield and civilians may themselves become objectives. The adversary may deliberately target civilians and may use civilians as shields or as a base of support. The presence of civilians and our obligations to them must be considered.

### **We Will Operate In Uncertainty**

All military operations, from major theater wars to the complex contingencies encountered in other expeditionary operations occur in an inherently uncertain and



chaotic environment shaped by continuous human interaction. Civilian populations, organizations, and leaders will cause much of this uncertainty. The commander must shape events  in this context of unpredictability. CMO assists the commander in controlling chaos focusing on our own efforts and the efforts of other organizations. Although the MAGTF may not direct the efforts of others, interaction, coordination, and cooperation with agencies outside of the MAGTF may provide answers to critical questions.

## **MAGTF CMO is different**

All U.S. forces conduct CMO as an element of their operations. MAGTF operations have unique characteristics .

### **The Marine Corps organizes Forces for Operations as a MAGTF.**

The Marine Corps operates as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), integrated, combined-arms forces that include air, ground, and combat service support units under a single commander. MAGTFs are task-organized to accomplish specific missions, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacetime engagement activities, crisis resolution, and conflict.

### **The MAGTF may Serve as an Initial Entry Force.**

As the nation's premier expeditionary force in readiness, Marines are prepared to operate anywhere our national interests require. The Marine Corps is the only Service tasked by Congress to operate as an integrated combined arms force providing a joint force enabler in three dimensions – air, land, and sea. Marine CMO helps shape the battle space for later MAGTF, joint, or international efforts. MAGTF CMO planners must create an information system or architecture that supports the follow-on deployment of CA forces. However, MAGTF CMO cannot be conducted independent of the wide variety of other governmental and relief agencies that will already be present in the battlespace.

### **The MAGTF may Fight from the Sea**

During operations, some or all of our forces may remain aboard amphibious shipping. This presents both advantages and disadvantages for civil-military operations. We may have the benefit of a secure and supported location from which to begin initial coordination and conduct planning. We may also have access to shipboard communications links that supply information and facilitate coordination. Maritime pre-positioning shipping may provide equipment and supplies.

As a challenge, we must be prepared to execute CMO to rapidly project power. We may not have the luxury of time and space to build-up the CMO effort. The development of pre-planned, pre-packaged, on-call CMO support may be required to enhance responsiveness. Time and distance factors may make face to face coordination with civilian agencies difficult. Dedicated personnel, including CA Marines, may need to be deployed ashore even while the MAGTF remains based at sea

**CMO policy may be Established Outside of the MAGTF.**

When Marines fight as part of a larger joint task force, the Joint Force Commander will establish guidance and policies for civil military operations. The MAGTF must be responsive to this guidance. Responsive to CMO policy from above to ensure unity of effort, the MAGTF must ensure its own concerns are effectively integrated into the overall CMO effort through careful coordination.

**The MAGTF may Conduct Decentralized Operations.**

MAGTF operations may be conducted with mission type orders that decentralize control and give subordinate commanders operational flexibility. However, individual and unit initiative must be tempered with an understanding of the civil effects of their actions.

**The MAGTF will Interface with Civilians**

The MAGTF will need to coordinate with a wide variety of non-military populations, organizations, and leaders. They will impact the manner in which we plan and execute operations. Cooperation with civilians and understanding their needs can mitigate problems and help keep MAGTF resources focused on operational objectives. Civilians Marines can expect to interface with include the following. MAGTF CMO asks them the following questions:

- **What will they do?**
- **What do we want them to do?**
- **How can we make that happen?**
- **What do we need to know in order to make that happen?**

**Populations**

People live in the areas in which we operate. These people may be ethnically and culturally diverse. Planning considerations include:

- |                   |                                     |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| * Men vs. Women   | * Political                         |
| * Factions/Groups | * Economic                          |
| * Ethnic          | * HN Contractor & Service providers |
| * Racial          | * Linguistic                        |

**Indigenous Civilian Leaders**

We cannot hope to communicate with each and every affected civilian. Instead, we seek to communicate with their leaders, those who control government, resources, and influence and guide the opinions and actions of the population. The selection of individuals and organizations that we communicate and coordinate with is of critical importance. We must identify and work with the real leaders, understanding that positions and titles may not indicate true power or influence. We must appreciate that civilian leaders have their own agendas, priorities, power bases, and biases. Leaders of public action and opinion include:

- |                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| * Government/Political | * Grassroots/Opinion Leaders              |
| * Religious            | * Public Safety & Public Health Officials |
| * Ethnic               | * Public Administrators                   |



### **Other Government Agencies**

Military forces are only one of the instruments of national power. Other tools include Other Government Agencies (OGAs). We may operate alongside these agencies. OGAs we are likely to meet in the AO include:

- American Embassy (AMEMB) personnel
- Department of State (DOS)
- US Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)

### **International and Nongovernmental Organizations (IOs/NGOs)**

Many International and Nongovernmental Organizations respond to crisis and conflict to help alleviate human suffering. These agencies have expertise, personnel, supplies, and a demonstrated, sustained commitment in the AO that the MAGTF typically does not have. Coordination with these agencies can help establish conditions that lead to mission accomplishment and reduce costly duplication of effort. The relationship between the MAGTF and IOs/NGOs is mutually beneficial. However, these organizations are not under military command.

### **Civilians outside the AO**

MAGTF operations are linked to national policies and strategies that are of worldwide interest. Our actions must support these strategies while considering the potential media effect. Worldwide audiences include:

- The region
- Our allies and partners
- U.S. citizens and media
- Other nations of the world

### **Legal/Doctrinal Roots**

The legal responsibilities of commanders and their forces to civilian populations is described in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and is critically important. Department of Defense policy is contained in DOD Directive 2000.13 Civil Affairs. Joint doctrine is contained in Joint Pub 3-57 *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* and in Joint Pub 3-57.1 *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*. Doctrinal publications of the other services, while not directive, are generally complementary and serve as valuable resources to the MAGTF.

“The presence of so many civilian refugees in the streets and rubble vastly complicated the battle and necessitated extraordinary measures to ensure target identification and limit indiscriminate firing. Whenever troops stopped to reorganize “children appeared among them,” observed Life magazine photographer David Douglas Duncan. ‘Children gentle and tiny and wide-eyed as they fastened themselves to the men who first ignored them ... then dug them their own little foxholes and expertly adapted helmets to fit their baby heads.’ ”

- *Battle of the Barricades: U.S. Marines in the Recapture of Seoul*

## II. CIVIL-MILITARY Objectives

"2. CONCEPT. The operation will feature multiple parallel and concurrent operations conceptually divided into five phases:

- 1.) Stop the dying in Goma,
- 2.) Encouragement of refugees to return to their homes,
- 3.) Support of stability in home provinces and to Humanitarian Relief Organizations,
- 4.) Turnover of support activities to appropriate UN agencies and
- 5.) Redeployment of U.S. forces."

- Joint Task Force Hope SUPPORT HOPE Operational Concept  
26 July 1994

### Principles

Certain general principles apply to all civil military operations. These common principles provide a basis for initial planning and apply to civil military operations across the full operational spectrum.

**Objective:** All CMO should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Effective CMO focuses the efforts of the MAGTF and all other governmental and non-governmental agencies on common an objective. MAGTF commanders translate strategic aims into essential objectives and ensure that unity of effort is maintained. When defining objectives special attention should be paid to clearly stating what will constitute mission success and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. Changes in political objectives may affect operational objectives.

**Unity of Effort:** All civil military operations should achieve common purpose and direction through unity of effort. While the MAGTF does not exercise command and control over external agencies, it can use exercise communication, coordination, and liaison to focus the CMO effort. The goal is to achieve unity of effort among all agencies in every operation by identifying common goals and coordinating the means to achieve them.

**Security:** Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. The principle of security presents unique challenges to civil military operations, which inherently seeks to increase contact with new partners and to facilitate information flow. Commanders and staffs will need to consider if civilian facilities and agencies will be provided with armed protection.

**Restraint:** Military capabilities must be applied prudently. Judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the rules of engagement and are quickly informed of

changes. Rules of engagement during civil military operations are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns.

**Perseverance:** Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some civil military operations may require years to achieve the desired results. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. Often the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success.

**Legitimacy:** Legitimate use of force will convince our enemies that it is unwise and, ultimately, wrong to seek conflict. Civil military operations must contribute to the real and perceived legitimacy of our operations. The operation must be both legally and morally correct, supporting internationally agreed upon objectives while employing acceptable means. We must enhance the stature of civil structures we are supporting, including local and national governments, as well as regional or international coalitions and alliances. We should consider how adversaries misrepresent our actions to affect local and international opinion.

**Impartiality:** Crisis often includes conflicts between people, parties, and organizations. These factions may be parties involved in an armed conflict; religious, ethnic, or regional groups battling over power and resources; or political leaders and organizations seeking to enhance their power, prestige, or position. Whenever possible, civil military operations observe strict impartiality, leaving all but armed conflicts to be resolved by local methods without outside interference or influence. The perception of our impartiality is at least as important as our actions. During both planning and execution we should consider whether our actions may inadvertently be perceived as favoring one or another of competing individuals and parties, and take steps to counter negative impressions.

**Consent:** Almost exclusively, our interactions with civilians are based on their consent. A civil military operation may be specifically tasked to provide to support a civil organization such as a host nation and its agencies. The relief agencies we interact with are not subject to our directions and may actively work to demonstrate their independence from the military. Representatives of other US government agencies often operate outside of our chain of command. Even when law permits us to require certain actions of civilian populations, a campaign to obtain their consent will always greatly enhance our ability to achieve our objectives.

**Regional and Cultural Considerations:** Our plans and actions must take into account the goals, norms, and values of the people with whom we work, never assuming that they are the same as ours. Our expectations of other people and organizations may not be met if we take for granted that others will work as we would, and for the same reasons.

**Support to Civil Authority:** Some civil military operations, such as consequence management or humanitarian assistance, will place the MAGTF in direct support of civilian leaders and agencies. Operations within the United States will take the lead from the designated lead federal agency. Abroad, civil military operations may support a host nation government. These operations will be closely coordinated with and may be directed by the Ambassador, Chief of Mission, or the United Nations.

"The struggle was in the rice paddies...in and among the people, not passing through, but living among them, night and day...and joining with them in steps toward a better life long overdue."

Memoirs of Gen. Lew Walt USMC, Retired

**Combined Action:** Civil military operations are most effective when they embrace the people and their institutions. The cooperative inclusion of local organizations and authorities we can strengthen of our forces. For example, Military Police are more effective when teamed with host nation civil police. Operational planners are wise to consult with local authorities when making decisions. In each case combined actions with the participation of respected local individuals and institutions enhances the legitimacy of our operations. We should always operate from a basis of partnership and mutual respect.

**USG Agency Coordination:** Civil military operations and the missions they support are complex and require the effective coordination and integration of many U.S. government (USG) agencies. Detailed coordination creates a common framework for planning and an understanding of common purpose. Many agencies have unique skills, resources, and experiences. Cooperation, coordination based on respect and moral purpose can unify the effort. To facilitate coordination, civil affairs forces should seek to define a clear chain of command whenever possible.

**Facilitation of Effort:**

"The bottom line is that a military peacekeeping operation will reach its desired end-state quicker, if a conscious effort is made to assist the humanitarian agencies and NGOs, and, where possible, the local or national authorities, in taking over all the humanitarian tasks".

- *Statement by Mr. Ross Mountain, Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator and Director, OCHA-Geneva. For meeting of the "Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping" NATO HQ, Brussels 24 April, 1998*

Instead of performing many functions by itself, civil military operations facilitate the efforts of other organizations. For example, there may be a requirement to feed a group of civilians. The MAGTF could task the combat service support element with this mission, providing not only the food itself but also the logistics to deliver it. Preferably, however, MAGTF civil affairs personnel might identify an agency with available food stocks, and perhaps another with logistics capabilities. By coordinating their activities, and perhaps by providing enabling capabilities such as security, communications, and air or seaport access, the mission is accomplished without unnecessary use of military resources. By developing and advertising simple procedures and points of contact, the MAGTF enables other agencies with substantial resources to meet requirements with minimum use of MAGTF resources. Whenever possible, CMO seeks synergy; the combination of efforts and resources, which has a combined effect greater than those same resources would have if left to work in isolation.

- **Assessment and Analysis.** Civil affairs personnel can assist the MAGTF in assessing social, cultural, and economic factors. They can provide the commander with area assessments that can provide a basis for developing guidance and for planning. They can analyze the role of other agencies and recommend courses of action that synchronize civil military operations.

"It is essential that we understand the enemy on his own terms. We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, fights as we do, or has the same values or objectives."

- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

- **Information Component.** Civil military operations are inherently suited to support the battle for influence. At the ground level, actions between the MAGTF and civilian organizations put deeds to words, providing positive, tangible examples of U.S. intentions. Conversely, when MAGTF interactions with civilians can be portrayed in a negative light by an adversary there is no doubt that they will be. The information component of civil military operations must not merely be anticipated, it must be aggressively exploited. It will help win public support, solidify coalitions, support diplomacy, and isolate the enemy. Popular support contributes to the success of civil military operations. The importance of coordinating civil affairs activities with public affairs and psychological operations cannot be overstressed. Information released through one of these channels potentially affects all audiences.

## Fundamental Objectives

### Support the Commander

The first objective of CMO is to support the MAGTF commander in the accomplishment of his mission. CMO does not assist organizations or groups as its primary purpose. These efforts are secondary to the operation. Confusion about the objectives of CMO may occur during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Military assistance in the provision of assistance to victims of natural disasters is always done at the discretion of the MAGTF Commander. Depending on the MAGTF mission, CMO will have a varying role to play. In the case of peacetime engagement efforts, the objective of CMO is to prevent crisis. The presence of the MAGTF may be intended to reassure local inhabitants about U.S. support, to demonstrate U.S. resolve to potential adversaries, or assist in civic improvements. Whatever the mission, peace or war, MAGTF CMO supports the Commander. CMO supports the commander by:

- Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with military operations.
- Identifying and coordinating acquisition of local resources.
- Assisting the commander in meeting legal obligations and moral considerations to the local population.
- Advising the commander of the CMO aspects and implications of current and proposed plans and operations.

## **Win the Fight**

The second fundamental objective of MAGTF is to win the fight. Every element of the force must contribute to warfighting. CMO helps the MAGTF win the fight at hand and to prepare to win the fight of tomorrow. CMO helps us to understand and win in the civil dimension.

## **Gain Situational Awareness**

CA personnel contribute to the commander's "finger-tip feel" of the battlefield, reducing the fog in which operations are planned and conducted, and enhancing situational awareness. Through their interaction with civilians, NGOs, and IOs, CA personnel provide highly relevant and timely information to which the MAGTF may not normally have access. CMO provides information that supports the commander's capability to make decisions, helps identify opportunities, and provides tactical information that supports combat operations.

## **Enhance Freedom of Action**

Effective CMO introduces options for the employment of forces and ensures the MAGTF commander can take the maximum advantage of the battlespace available to him. It helps to extend operations to the fullest breadth feasible, by minimizing political and logistics constraints in the AO. CMO supports the commander in arraying forces on the battlefield so as to maximize their operational effectiveness. This may require the enemy to disperse forces over a broad area, resulting in the virtual attrition of those forces and complicating enemy planning. Use of civil assets may allow MAGTF aviation elements to be forward-based, minimizing flight time to targets, increasing time available to support ground maneuver, or enabling more attacks on deep targets. MPF operations supported by CA personnel allow the commander to achieve operational maneuver. CMO can make logistics lines of communication, airfields, and seaports available to the MAGTF, enhancing support to the force. Finally, by developing effective links to local governments and communities, CMO removes these stresses from subordinate commanders, freeing them to focus on mission accomplishment.

## **Isolate the enemy.**

CMO works to limit the enemy commander's freedom of action, preventing support of civilian populations to the enemy forces. These civilians might be within the AO, in neighboring countries, or elsewhere within the region. Enemy forces may attempt to gain logistical support, information for use as intelligence, and even economic or political support. MAGTF CMO is conducted to minimize the support given to the enemy by solving civil problems, by winning the information fight, and persuading the populace of U.S. and coalition force power and moral intentions. Aggressive CMO denies the enemy a support base and environment in which he may operate.

## **Support the Force**

Effective CMO adds additional capabilities to the MAGTF, including assets provided by host nation, other governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations. CMO supports sustainment and provides access to logistics and support capabilities that are otherwise external to the MAGTF. Supplementing MAGTF resources allows military capabilities to remain dedicated to supporting the force. Auxiliary support will also permit greater massing of combat power. By minimizing the logistics footprint, CMO

reduces force vulnerabilities. However, integration of host nation and other governmental agency resources may present new force protection and security challenges.

"To successfully project American military power, assistance with deployment, arrival, and enroute support are critical requirements from our allies and friends. Host Nation Support and mutual support between allies should be constantly enhanced."  
- Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces

### **Employ as a weapon**

Thirdly, CMO, if used properly, can effectively shape the battlefield. Aggressive CMO requires the enemy commander to consider the relationship between his force and civil populations. CMO can shape the civil element of the battlefield and bring pressure on an adversary. The coordination of military activities with other governmental or international efforts can create a positive operational environment for the MAGTF. Likewise, coordinated CMO can reduce options for the adversary by reducing access to civilian materiel assets and by reducing civilian grievances that may be exploited. Coordinated CMO can also enhance readiness and force protection by contributing to the collective protection of friendly vulnerabilities and civilian infrastructure.

"More often than not, the center of gravity will be an intangible, essential element of the political and moral forces that keep our enemies in the fight against us"  
- MCDP 1 *Warfighting*

### **Win the Perception Battle**

Crisis, amplified by the connectivity of global communications, will ignite passions, spark reaction, crystallize beliefs, and compel people, nations, and organizations to think and act in accordance with their worldview and in reaction to the media. As a related element of Information Operations, CMO puts “meat on the message”, demonstrating in practical ways our message and countering disinformation and propaganda. Information shapes the battlespace and influences commanders, soldiers, and civilians alike.

### **CMO Goals**

CMO has three broad goals.

#### **Minimize Civilian Interference**

The MAGTF must assume that civilians will interfere with operations, generally unintentionally. Planning and execution must account for this interference, either by avoiding actions and locations that are likely to suffer from interference, or by taking measures to minimize interference.

#### **Maximize Civilian Support**

The MAGTF must actively seek to use civilian physical and human resources to operational advantage. Civilian supplies and logistics resources, appropriately and legally acquired, can reduce expeditionary logistic requirements. Equally important, by creating a supportive moral environment among civilian populations and organizations, the

MAGTF gains access to skills and information it would not otherwise have. This might include language, cultural, geographic, or economic information. At its most successful, CMO facilitates the collection of information from civilian sources that supports force protection and can be turned into intelligence. Whenever possible, the MAGTF hopes to make friends and avoid making more enemies.

### **Meet Legal and Moral Obligations**

Under international law and by U.S. policy the MAGTF commander has responsibilities to the civilian populace in his area of operations. Adherence to these responsibilities has a positive affect on the relationship between the MAGTF and civilians. More importantly, it supports our national policy objectives and its strategy to enhance America's security while promoting economic prosperity, democracy, and human rights abroad.

### **MAGTF CMO Objectives**

Civil military operation objectives for the MAGTF include:

- (1) Reduce Civilian Interference.
- (2) Support and Implement US National Policies.
- (3) Fulfill the Commander's Legal and Moral Responsibilities.
- (4) The Legal Acquisition of Civilian Resources in Support of Military Operations.
- (5) Re-establishing Civil Governing Capability.
- (6) Avoiding Damage to Property and Usable Resources.

### **Types of Civil Military Operations**

Every operation involving civilians is an example of civil military operations. Civil military operations focus on the relationship between military forces with civil authorities, nongovernmental organizations, independent organizations, and populations in areas where military forces are present. While executing civil military operations, the MAGTF may find itself involved in a wide variety of activities.

- **Populace and Resources Control (PRC).** The MAGTF, usually in conjunction with civil authorities, will often exercise PRC. PRC Operations provide security for the civilian population, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize civil material resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace controls measures include curfews, movement restrictions, checkpoints, travel permits, registration cards, ID cards, rationing, and the resettlement of villagers. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. There are two subcategories of PRC operations. They are Dislocated Civilian (DC) Operations and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). DC operations are concerned with managing the effects of DCs upon military operations, but to also provide/manage assistance to those civilians within the resources of a commander without detriment to his mission. NEO is defined as the ordered or authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, DOD, or appropriate U.S. commander. The DOS determines eligibility for those to be evacuated. U.S. military and dependents can be ordered out; private American citizens cannot.



- **Foreign Nation Support (FNS).**

FNS is the identification, coordination, and acquisition of FN resources such as supplies, materiel, and labor, to support mil forces and operations. The preferred means of fulfilling combat service support (CSS) requirements is to get appropriate goods and services locally through FNS.

In some theatres, specific terms describe categories of FNS. Host nation support (HNS) is support provided by a friendly country for military operations conducted within its borders, based on mutually concluded agreements. HNS includes the planning, negotiations for, and acquisition of such support. FNS may include support from countries that have no mutual agreements or treaties.

- **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (HA).** HA encompasses short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering. HA is usually conducted in response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat. HA is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civilian authorities or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. This type of assistance must not duplicate other forms of assistance provided by these agencies. MAGTF resources will generally be utilized only to assist or supplement civilian resources. The guiding principle is to only do what the civilian authorities or humanitarian relief organizations cannot do, or do that which is mission essential.

HA refers to a group of programs that authorize the use of DOD resources to conduct military operation of humanitarian nature. U.S. law provides for several methods of humanitarian assistance to foreign countries. At the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA), the military provides assistance to foreign countries during disaster relief operations. Excess military property may be given to foreign countries to support HA efforts. Chapter 20, Title 10 US Code provides the authority to support humanitarian and other assistance. Military transportation can be used to move excess military property or goods donated for relief efforts (Section 402 of Title 10, us Code). Humanitarian Civic Action (H/CA), Section 401, Title 10 US Code provides for humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with military operations and training. U.S. military units may assist foreign government and populace to improve their quality of life through rudimentary construction, health care, and sanitation programs. The Secretary of State must approve assistance to foreign nations. H/CA projects must promote the security interests of both the U.S. and the HN involved. Projects must also enhance the specific operational readiness skills of the participating U.S. service members. The projects may complement, but they cannot duplicate other USG programs.

- **Military Civic Action (MCA).** MCA involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. MCA is usually part of a comprehensive U.S. government security assistance programs. MCA uses preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of military forces with the population. MAGTF forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas. Properly planned, executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with local authorities, military, and community leaders, MCA

projects also result in popular support for the MAGTF and its mission. MCA is predominantly planned as short-term projects. Due to the legal considerations required when providing U.S. resources to foreign military forces or governments, close attention to plans and procedures is required by the SJA.

- **Nation Assistance Operations.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, are based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation Assistance Operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Humanitarian-Civil Assistance (HCA). All National Assistance operations are integrated through the U.S. Ambassador's Country Plan.
- **Civil Preparedness and Emergency Operations.** Civil preparedness and/or emergency operations are those activities and measures undertaken to: (1) minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would have been caused by a disaster; (2) deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and (3) effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster. Disaster preparedness is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies. It deals essentially with preparations for the immediate emergency conditions created by a disaster. These conditions might include those caused by armed conflict. MAGTF forces typically perform Civil Preparedness Operations as scheduled to support the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan. This may include MAGTF CA personnel supporting joint requirements.
- **Civil Administration.** Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory, human rights law, the international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict covering conflicts of an international or internal character. Civil Administration may be undertaken by agreement with a Host Nation which has lost the capacity to carry out its own affairs, or when the MAGTF takes part in the occupation of enemy territory. Civil administration functions are undertaken by U.S. commanders only when directed or approved by the NCA. The MAGTF has only limited capability to undertake civil administration with organic assets. If there is such a requirement for civil administration, the MAGTF will require support via the Joint Force Commander, to include civil affairs functional specialists and military judge advocates as well as civilian Public Safety, Public Administration, and legal experts. It will take time for this support to be provided, so the MAGTF must carefully consider and coordinate its requirements if there is any possibility the MAGTF will need to fulfill its legal and moral responsibilities to civilian populations under international standards.

- **Domestic Support Operations (DSO).** DSOs usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a “disaster area.” A DSO is designed to supplement the efforts and resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments, and voluntary organizations. The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of other federal agencies in accordance with the Federal Response Plan and unified command supporting plans. Military forces are typically organized in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA), such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Justice. Local commanders may also act in the event of an emergency under “immediate response authority” in order to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate great property damage prior to receiving direction from higher headquarters. Immediate notification of the chain of command is required. Because of the legalities involved with the domestic employment of military forces, it is essential to involve both SJA and PA planners as soon as possible. DSO includes three broad categories:
  - **Military Support to Domestic Relief Operations (DRO).** Support to DRO includes responding to and mitigating the effects of a natural or manmade disaster. These may include earthquake, forest fire, flood, chemical spills, power outages, and mass immigration emergencies. Employment of Marine forces is most appropriate in the early, or “response” stage of a DRO, focusing on life saving and sustainment of the civilian population, transitioning those responsibilities to civilian organizations as soon as practicable. FEMA is generally the LFA, and is typically in support of the affected state or local government.
  - **Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA).** Operations include Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS), counter-drug, combating terrorism, EOD support, and training for civilian law enforcement officials. Laws governing MSCLEA are complex and often change. It is essential to involve the SJA throughout planning and execution. The Department of Justice or one of its agencies is generally the LFA.
  - **Military Support to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).** Operations include the provision of specialized assistance to respond to a terrorist threat or incident. A unique C2 structure is in place for this type of DSO. The US Joint Forces Command’s Joint Task Force Civil-Support (JTF-CS) will have OPCON of all designated DOD assets in support of the LFA. A military response to these categories of domestic emergencies might include Crisis Management, Consequence Management, and/or Technical Operations. These types of responses might take place sequentially, simultaneously, or independently of each other.

JP 3-07.7 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations* provides detailed information on DSO, including C2 relationships for different types of operations.

The *Federal Response Plan* is a document signed by 27 Federal departments and agencies, including DoD. It details how Federal assistance is coordinated and delivered in support of State and local governments for disaster or emergency. It serves as a model and supplements other Federal emergency operations plans developed to address specific hazards

Marine forces have been employed in Direct Support (DS) in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, riots in Los Angeles, wildfires in the western US, and Hurricane Andrew in Florida. The Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) also has a significant role in response to WMD.

- **Crisis Management** response involves measures taken to resolve a hostile situation, investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law.
- **Consequence Management** response involves measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies.
- **Technical Operations** involve measures to address aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials. They may include assistance in identifying and assessing threats of hazardous materials, providing consultation to decision makers, or providing decontamination assistance.

### III. MAGTF CIVIL AFFAIRS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

#### Role and definitions

Marine civil affairs forces are trained, organized, and equipped to support the MAGTF commander's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct civil-military operations. Civil affair Marines support MAGTF missions across the full range of military operations and help the commander consider the civil implications of his military mission. Civil affairs personnel are an essential asset by virtue of their training, experience, cultural awareness, and knowledge of governmental and relief agencies. As special staff members, civil affairs personnel are the commander's principle advisors on civil-military relations.

**Civil Affairs** describes designated active and reserve forces and units organized, trained and equipped to conduct civil affairs activities and to support CMO. Civil Affairs is *neither a mission nor an objective, but a name* for designated personnel and units. USMC CA forces are principally designed to support CMO.

**Civil Affairs Activities** describe *actions* performed or supported by CA forces that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities; and (2) involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government.

Marine civil affairs personnel are both planners and operators. As planners, they consider the impact civilians have on military operations and the impact operations will have on civilians. They help the commander envision and achieve the desired operational endstate, ensuring the consideration of civil factors is not overlooked. As operators, they make assessments and gather information in the field, directly supervise portions of civil-military operations, coordinate with a wide variety of civil and military organizations, and provide advice to subordinate military commanders or civilian authorities. They coordinate local labor efforts, locate host nation resources and coordinate their usage, gather critical information, identify key facilities and protected targets, deliver information to civilians, and provide assistance to the judge advocate.

#### Marine Civil Affairs Forces

The Marine Corps does not maintain active civil affairs units. MAGTFs, with reserve augmentation, have the capability to plan and conduct civil affairs activities in contingency, crisis, or assistance operations. Civil military operations and civil affairs activities are carried out using all assets from within the MAGTF and are designed to support the assigned mission of the MAGTF.

#### Civil Affairs Groups

US Marine Corps Reserve civil affairs units consist of two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) that augment the capability of the MAGTF. The CAGs reinforce the active forces and provide a capability that the MAGTF does not otherwise possess. The CAGs, when activated, are capable of self-administration, but they require support from the MAGTF command element to coordinate logistic support. The 3<sup>rd</sup> CAG is located at Camp Pendleton, California. The 4<sup>th</sup> CAG is located at Anacostia, Washington, D.C.. The CAGs are not regionally bound and provide global support to all MAGTFs. Within the active force, the Legal Service Support Section within the Fleet Service Support Group can provide a limited, interim civil affairs capability by supporting the MAGTF commander's need to plan and coordinate civil affairs activities prior to the activation of the CAG or in conjunction with advance CAG personnel.

When activated the CAG can provide civil affairs support a MEF. The CAG is organized with a Group Headquarters and a number of Civil Affairs Detachments. The Group HQ is organized into a Command Section and Staff Sections, along with Communications, Motor Transport, and Public Health Sections. The Group HQ provides the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF CE, as well as command and control of subordinate CA elements. In garrison, the CAG HQ is responsible for training and equipping subordinate elements, preparing them for deployment, and coordinating their support to the operating forces. It maintains continuous communications with supported MEFs, advising the MEF commander and ensuring that plans, exercises, and operations include appropriate CA and CMO concerns. The Civil Affairs Detachments have an International Law Team, Displaced Persons/Refugees (DP/R) Team, Liaison Officer, Loudspeaker Section, and three general purpose CA Teams.

### **Civil Affairs Detachment**

A CA Detachment supports the MEU or a Major Subordinate Command of the MEF. The CA Detachment is organized with a detachment headquarters, several functionally-oriented teams, and one or more general purpose CA Teams. While all CA forces can assist the MAGTF to plan, coordinate, and execute CMO, the CA Detachment is the smallest element that can execute the more specialized civil affairs activities without reinforcement.

### **Civil Affairs Team**

A Civil Affairs Team supports the Marine Expeditionary Unit or Major Subordinate Element of the MEB.

### **Civil Affairs Forces Solve Problems**

In 1965, the commander of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines had a problem. Lt Col William Taylor was assigned a mission that might be given to a Marine unit tomorrow morning, commanding one of the first ground units deployed to Viet Nam and charged with defending a forward airbase at Phu Bai. Lt Col Taylor's problem was that thousands of people lived within his Area of Operations, inhabiting known VC villages within mortar range of the airstrip, and he didn't have the strength to constantly occupy all of this 10 square-mile area. 3/4 's Civil Affairs officer, Captain John Mullin had an idea to help solve his commander's problem. He thought it might be possible to work with the local militia, known as the Popular Forces or "PF's" to provide a constant presence in each hamlet, but the PF's were poorly trained, ill-equipped, completely

lacking in motivation. Capt Mullin's idea, integrating Marine infantry squads with PF platoons and greatly increasing the size of the area a single infantry battalion could control, eventually became known as the Combined Action Program. Marines in Combined Action Platoons lived together with the Vietnamese, eating, sleeping, fighting and sometimes dying together. The Marines were trained in Vietnamese culture and traditions, sent to language classes whenever possible, and made it a point to salute Vietnamese officers and colors. They developed civic action programs, and began to work with organizations such as USAID, with NGOs, and even with some of the small allied military units in Viet Nam.

The VC never regained control of a single village that had a CAP platoon, and a number of inventive leaders began to recommend the Combined Action concept as the only realistic way to fight and win the war in Viet Nam. Eventually the Marine Corps drew down the number of Marines assigned to the Combined Action units. At its height, however, there were almost 100 CAP platoons, two thousand Marines at a time working all across the Marine Area of Operations in Viet Nam, and organized into a force composed of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2d, 3d, and 4th Combined Action Groups.

## **Support to the MAGTF**

### **Concepts of Support**

#### **Preplanned Support**

As Reserve Component (RC) units, the CAGs provide continuous and worldwide support to the operating forces. Much of this support is prior to CAG unit activation. Both preplanned events and contingencies are generally supported in an incremental fashion. Preplanned events support theater engagement strategies and service or joint exercises. The CAGs also support deliberate planning efforts for standing operational plans and review the development of doctrine and formal school curricula.

A variety of orders and authorization processes are used for preplanned support. Occasionally, even "Inactive Duty for Training" periods, usually called drills, can be devoted to types of CA support. With sufficient advance notice, Annual Training (AT) periods, generally two weeks in length, can be scheduled to provide appropriate support. When support is required for longer periods, a number of overlapping AT increments might be planned, providing continuous support to the commander. Specific missions also may be authorized with Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) orders, which are generally limited to 179 days in a fiscal year but may be much shorter in duration. ADSW orders are especially useful for regular commitments, such as billets continuously involved in theater engagement.

Schedules and locations for exercises and operations often change. This can jeopardize preplanned CA deployments and may result in degraded support. CAG members are reservists and may not be able to respond quickly to schedule changes. The coordination of funding and generation of new orders is required to prevent delays.

Pre-deployment exercises, such as the MEU(SOC) workups, are prioritized for support. Supporting civil affairs elements sharpen staff integration by participating in pre-deployment exercises with the deploying MAGTF. Preplanned exercises and deployed support serve as rehearsals and facilitate contingency support. Although these earmarked

CA forces remain in the US, they are available for deployments overseas for as required by the MAGTF.

### **Contingency Support**

When activated, the CAGs reinforce the active forces and provide capabilities normally not resident in the MAGTF. The CAGs are prepared to provide immediate support to MAGTFs engaged in contingency operations, generally within less than 72 hours. CA support is provided by echelon. Each CAG maintains a list of CA personnel ready to support time sensitive contingency operations. Ideally, the CA Team Commander has participated in the supported MAGTF's exercise program. Members volunteer for assignment. The CAG supports the deployed echelon by reachback, using stateside assets to support forward deployed elements. This support might include cultural, economic, or political research, and authorized coordination with US-based organizations. Follow-on increments of the CAG might be subject to involuntary activation such as Presidential Recall (PRC). And finally, entire CAGs may be mobilized in support of a deployed MEF. CA Detachments and Teams will often deploy prior to full mobilization of other reserve forces.

As reserve units, CA elements may join a MAGTF that is already deeply involved in rapid planning. The CA officer has a substantial challenge to begin assisting the MAGTF commander while preparing his own force for mission planning and execution. It is vital that the CA effort be prioritized and rapidly integrated within the MAGTF concept of operations.

### **CA Tasks**

Marine civil affairs forces are multi-purpose forces, equipped with a variety of skills, expertise, and experience. They enhance the MAGTF's ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct civil military operations. They:

#### **Specified Tasks**

- Minimize civilian interference with MAGTF operations by executing population and resource control
- Maximize utilization of civilian resources in support of the MAGTF mission
- Assist the MAGTF Commander in meeting his legal and moral obligations to civilian populations
- Provide limited civilian administration
- Provide integrated environmental health assessment and planning capabilities
- Provide for operation of the CMOC in support of the MAGTF COC

#### **Implied Tasks**

- Act as the interface between the MAGTF Commander and civilian agencies and organizations, including: U.S. government agencies, host nation and other



government agencies, United Nations organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and displaced persons and refugee associations

- Coordinate MAGTF civil-military operations with higher, adjacent, and supporting commands
- Provide cultural and regional expertise in support of MAGTF operations
- Train and prepare the MAGTF for civil-military operations
- Ensure an orderly and prompt transition of CMO responsibilities to other authorities and agencies

### **MAGTF Civil Affairs Capabilities**

The Civil Affairs Groups and Civil Affairs Detachments are organized to provide a limited number of CA capabilities to the MAGTF. Marine civil affairs personnel are considered generalists. They are skilled advisors, planners, coordinators, and supervisors who provide multi-purpose support to the commander. When additional functional specialty skills are required to support operations, the CA officer will make a recommendation to the MAGTF commander to request external support. The MAGTF will assume civil sector responsibilities (i.e. utilities) only as a last resort and will transition them to the joint force or civilian authorities as rapidly as possible.

Depending upon the mission, task-organization, and resources available, Civil Affairs Groups and Detachments are broadly capable in nine functional areas:

#### **Primary**

- Dislocated Civilians
- Cultural Relations
- Public Safety
- Civilian Supply
- Civil Information
- Legal
- Public Health

#### **Limited**

- Public Works and Utilities
- Public Communications

### **Primary Functional Capabilities**

#### **Dislocated Civilians**

#### **Definitions**

Dislocated civilian is a broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee.

Displaced Persons are civilians who are involuntarily outside the national boundaries of their country.

An expellee is a civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes.

Evacuees are civilians removed from their places of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.

Refugees are civilians who by reason of real or imagined danger have left their homes to seek safety elsewhere.

### **Objectives**

There are four objectives when conducting dislocated civilian operations:

- (1) To reduce the interference with military operations.
- (2) To prevent the outbreak of disease.
- (3) To alleviate suffering.
- (4) To centralize DCs.

### **Considerations**

There are five considerations when handling dislocated civilians.

- (1) Control. The most critical issue in DC operations. Consider the establishment of Civilian Collection Points (CCP), and stand fast, and stay-put policies.
- (2) Movement. Primarily a Military Police function. Route selection, route identification, control and assembly points, and emergency rest areas are considerations.
- (3) Evacuation. Whenever possible, evacuation should be avoided. It may arouse resentment, complicate control, complicate security, and unnecessarily expend time and resources.
- (4) Facilities. Many considerations are involved when accommodating dislocated civilians such as camp size, location, layout, administration, screening, segregation of sexes and ethnic groups, medical care, sanitation, supply, transportation, and information dissemination.
- (5) Disposition. The ultimate objective in the disposition of DCs is to allow them to return to their homes.

### **During DC operations, CA forces can:**

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing DC activities, including locations and movement within the MAGTF AO.

- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, caring for, controlling, processing, and repatriating DCs in support of CMO. Supervise MAGTF planning and operation of DC camps,
- Plan movement control measures, emergency care, and evacuation of DCs. Coordinate provision of transportation, military police support, military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical services as required.
- Assist the Staff Judge Advocate in advising the commander on legal and moral responsibilities with respect to DCs in accordance with U.S. policy and international law.

## **Cultural Relations**

To support cultural relations, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on CMO.
- Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training U.S. personnel in the FN social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
- Advise and assist in locating, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property, i.e., identify protected targets (PT).
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.
- Assist the process of determining private ownership via property title protection and verification.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. Government assistance and resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.

## **Public Safety**

To support Public Safety, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.

- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.

## **Civilian Supply**

To support civilian supply, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Determine the availability of local supplies.
- Identify private and public property available for military use.
- Coordinate the use of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in FN cultural intricacies when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).
- Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.
- Assist in coordinating FN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.

## **Civil Information**

To support civil information, CA forces can:

- Advise and assist in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support and legitimize the HN government administration. Provide the “single voice” message.
- Advise, assist, develop plans, and provide operational oversight and supervision in the employment of civil information (mass media) agencies and resources to support CMO (radio, TV, print, and newspaper), both public and private.
- Assist PSYOP forces in planning, developing, and disseminating proclamations, ordinances, and notices.

- Advise and assist the public affairs officer (PAO) in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing with the media.
- Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

### **International Law**

To support international law, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in identifying and assessing HN legal systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes, and statutes.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and the impact of those on CMO.
- Assist the SJA in educating and training U.S. personnel in the HN legal system, obligations, and consequences.
- Assist the SJA in international law issues.
- Coordinate with the SJA to assist and advise HN judicial agencies.
- Conduct liaison and monitor the HN judiciary system to resolve differences in administration of laws, agreements, and policies.

### **Public Health**

To support public health, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinate with the HN government private resources for CMO use in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating HN, IO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
- Advise and assist HN, IO, NGO, and U.S. agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation). If one considers Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, there are adequate Preventive Medicine (PM) assets for such scenarios. Additionally, there are PM

assets that can be requested through the chain of command from either the MEF Surgeon (G-4 Med) or from the PM assets in the Medical Battalion (FSSG).

## **Limited Functional Capabilities**

Marine CA personnel also have a limited capability in other functional areas. These skills are primarily focused on performing initial assessments of the functions, which facilitates initial planning and identifies the need for further expertise. Additional expertise will be sourced from outside the MAGTF. It may be provided by functional specialists from US Army CA forces. It may also be provided by other US government agencies, or by international, nongovernmental, or host nation organizations.

### **Public Works and Utilities**

To support public works and utilities, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

### **Public Communications**

To support public communications, CA forces can:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of these systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public communications resources to support government administration and CMO.

#### **Army CA Forces**

The vast majority of U.S. CA assets are in the US Army, soon to total some 6,000 soldiers. The Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has combatant command authority of all U.S. Army CA forces stationed in the U.S., and provides CA

forces in support of the warfighting CINCs. A single Active Component (AC) unit, the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne), provides some 250 CA generalists for immediate deployment worldwide. The AC Bn provides rapid deployment, short-duration CA support for non-mobilization contingency operations. It is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA functional specialty skills. Instead, it gives a supported commander an initial capability to assess the situation, to develop a CMO estimate of the situation, and to recommend the deployment of more specialized personnel, often reservists. Each Company in the Bn is regionally oriented to support one of the warfighting CINCs.

The remainder of U.S. Army CA forces, some 95% of the total, are in the Reserve Component (RC) and are organized to provide tailored support to strategic, operational, and tactical commanders. Within USSOCOM, there are four regionally oriented CA Commands (CACOMS), each aligned in "wartrace" to a geographic CINC. The CACOM provides support at the unified, sub-unified, or theater component command level. When deployed, the CACOM Commander is the geographic CINCs senior CA advisor. The CACOM is staffed with highly skilled functional specialists task-organized into Government, Public Facilities, Economic/Commerce, and Special Functions Teams. Each CACOM is assigned a number of CA Brigades, which support JTF or corps-level commanders. Finally, CA Battalions are assigned to the CA Brigades, and support brigade to division level commanders. These organizations are additive: CA Commands, Brigades, and Battalions would be deployed to fight a Major Theater War (MTW).

## **IV. CMO Integration**

### **The Role of the Civil Affairs Officer**

Civil Affairs falls under the staff cognizance of the G/S-3. The MAGTF CA officer is normally the commanding officer of the CAG, detachment commander of the CA Detachment, or team leader of a CA Team. The CA officer is dual-hatted, having both command and staff responsibilities. The CA officer supports the commander's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct MAGTF civil-military operations. The CA officer has the responsibility to enhance the relationship between the MAGTF, civil authorities, and civilian populations in order to ensure the success of the MAGTF's assigned mission.

The CA officer's first responsibility will be to advise the MAGTF commander and support operational planning. Next, the CA officer coordinates CMO with military CA forces and the civilian organizations in the AO. Finally, CA will need to execute activities where the MAGTF may require additional functional expertise. The CA force needs to swiftly develop a comprehensive understanding of both the military and civil dimensions of the situation. The CA section continuously disseminates such information in order to prepare forces that may follow or augment. Perhaps most importantly, CA brings a different perspective to the Marine Corps Planning Process. While other members of the staff look inward to the battlespace, the CA Marine looks outward.

The CA officer normally operates under the staff cognizance of the Operations Officer. However, in situations in which civil-military considerations are a priority, the MAGTF commander may choose to designate the CA officer as a member of the general/executive staff. Here, CA efforts will focus on the planning of operations and preparations for likely turns of events. At the MEU, MAGTF, or in an MSE, future planning is the responsibility of the G/S-3. At the MARFOR, MEF, and MEB level the G-5, Future Operations Group (FOG), is the principal staff assistant for future planning and joint planning matters. In any case, it is vital that assigned CA forces provide support to Plans functions as well as to the conduct of Operations. Like all commanders, the CA officer positions himself from where he can best influence the action. As a planner and advisor, the CA officer must place himself to best support the MAGTF planning effort. The CA officer's duties include the following responsibilities:

- Serve as a member of the Battlestaff.
- Advise the commander of the potential civilian impact on military operations.
- Advise the commander concerning the potential impact of military operations on civilian populations.
- Advise the commander on the employment of other military units and U.S. assets that can perform or assist CMO.
- Assist the commander in meeting his legal and moral obligations to civilian populations under his control.
- Serve as the commander's principle interface with external non-military agencies that may be operating within the AO. NGOs, IOs, the U.S. Government, and foreign government agencies.



- Advises the commander of changes in the political environment which may change the military situation
- Identify CMO goals and objectives to support the mission, the JFC's intent, and develops plans accordingly.
- Employ CA forces to support effective command and control and the scheme of maneuver.

US Army formations designate CMO as a functional area led by one of the Coordinating Staff officers. This principle staff officer is designated as the G/S-5, and is responsible for all matters concerning CMO. USA units authorize the G/S-5 at all echelons from battalion to corps: the billet is actually staffed only at division and corps level until a smaller unit actually deploys. In many cases, the G/S-5 is a CA officer by training and MOS. Upon assignment to an Army command, USA/R CA units provide integrated/full spectrum support to the G/S-5.

Currently, all Marine Corps CA units reside in the SMCR. Although CA officers may not be deployed with the MEU or MAGTF, school-trained personnel in the active force may provide a limited CA capability. In the conduct of joint operations, other-Service augmentation of the Marine Corps CA capability may be requested via the JFC. When trained CA personnel are not immediately available, the commander may designate a member of the staff to undertake the function. This individual is the person who should constantly consider:

- 1) What will civilians do?
- 2) What do we want them to do?
- 3) How can the MAGTF encourage this to happen?
- 4) What does the MAGTF need to know in order to make this happen?

### **Command and Control of CMO**

CMO is a function of the command and control process. Therefore, it is critical to have CA personnel at each level that exercises command and control of the MAGTF. Command and control is a center of gravity for CA efforts.

“Personalities often are more important than processes.  
You need the right people in the right places.”  
-Gen A.C. Zinni, USMC

### **Command Element (CE)**

When supporting a MAGTF without an assigned Political Advisor.

Marine CA primarily facilitates CMO by assisting the MAGTF commander to plan and coordinate efforts for other elements of the MAGTF to execute. Therefore, CA support is initially assigned to the MAGTF CE. Upon activation, the CAG is attached, less Administrative Control (ADCON), to the MEF Commander. Unless transferred, ADCON is retained by MARFORRES. CA Detachments and Teams support the MEU in a similar fashion. As the situation dictates, the CA element may be tasked-organized to directly support other elements of the MAGTF, usually for particular phases of an operation and for a limited duration. The Operations Officer has primary responsibility for CMO at the CE, and has staff cognizance over CA efforts. As the MAGTF Operations and Plans staff sections organize for combat, they form Integrated Staff Cells (ISCs). CA Personnel support the ISCs and the Battlestaff.

### **Battlestaff**

The Battlestaff consists of the principal staff officers, AC/S G-1 through G-6 and designated Special Staff, including the MAGTF CA officer. The Battlestaff members are the MEF Commander's primary advisers. They will closely monitor the areas under their staff cognizance, and provide detailed recommendations, information and analysis to the Future Plans and Future Operations Cells. As a member of the Battlestaff, the MAGTF CA Officer will:

- Assist the commander in developing and then achieving his vision for operations.
- Integrate CA concerns into plans and operations.
- Recommend intelligence requirements to the G-2.
- Manage the commander's interface with interagency, NGO, IO, and HN civil agencies.
- Plan, direct, and supervise MEF CA liaisons to external commands.
- Monitor the battle.

### **Future Operations Group**

The Future Operations Group (FOG) conducts detailed planning for the MEF's next mission. The group is chaired by the AC/S G-5 and includes representatives from the Battlestaff, Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), and Subject Matter Experts (SME). The FOG will normally construct the MEF's Campaign Plan and establish timelines and phases. They will work closely with MEF HHQ's FutPlns to ensure that the MEF is assigned adequate resources and appropriate battlespace for the anticipated mission. The FOG ensures the MEF plan is synchronized with the supported CINC's and the Component Commander's intent. CA support to the FOG cell includes:

- Constructing the MAGTF Campaign plan, shaping conditions for the next battle.
- Identify and coordinate for additional resources to support CMO, including CA functional specialists and other Subject Matter Experts.
- Synchronize CMO with the CINC's intent and with other components, including establishing liaison.
- Develop Support Requirements from higher and adjacent commands.

- Establish a planning relationship with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs as appropriate.
- Develop CMO transition and redeployment plans.

### **Future Operations Cell**

The Future Operations Cell (FutOps) Cell, under the direction of the AC/S G-3, is chaired by the G-3 Future Operations Officer and includes representatives of the Battlestaff, MSCs and SMEs. Future Operations conducts detailed planning for MSC's next mission change. The FutOps cell focuses on new frag order and changes to the mission for the MSC's elements and forms and leads the integrated planning effort. CA support to the FutOps cell includes:

- Participate in the integrated planning effort.
- Develop/recommend Commander's Critical Information Requests (CCIR) and Priority of Information (PIR).
- Develop briefs and slides to provide a basis for command decisions.
- Develop OpOrders and Frag Orders.
- Prepare supporting plans including the Annex G "Civil Affairs."
- Coordinate with the G-5 to obtain external USG, CINC, and Service Support.
- Interact with the Force Fires Coordinator and the MEF Target Board. Identify and provide a KF and PT list.

### **Current Operations Cell**


The Current Operations (CurOps) Cell also includes Current Intelligence, Current Fires, and representatives of the Battlestaff. Under the direction of the AC/S G-3, the Current Operations Officer coordinates the current battle and ensures adherence to the MEF Commander's Intent. CA support to CurOps includes:

- Execute the Plan.
- Direct assignment of CA support to subordinate elements.
- Monitor the battle, including the CMO component of the operation.
- Analyze, interpret, and assess battle space information and events from a CMO perspective.
- Provide information and input for command decisions.
- Coordinate and assist development of the FragO to adjust the current plan.
- Assess intelligence collection.

### **Civil Affairs Operations Cell**

The MAGTF CA officer may determine that a distinct CA Ops Cell is the most efficient means to support all of the MAGTFs Integrated Staff Cells. The CA Ops Cell is located in the Future Operations Cell, which leads the MAGTF's integrated planning effort. It is useful when limited personnel and facilities prevent the assignment of dedicated CA

elements to each of the ISCs. Instead, the CA Ops Cell performs the majority of CA planning in a central location, while providing representation in each of the ISCs as continuously as possible. The CA officer continues to provide comprehensive support to the Battlestaff. The CA Ops Cell is not a location for interface with organizations or persons external to the MAGTF. This interface takes place primarily in the CMOC.



#### CA Ops Cell Tasks

- Develops concepts and plans for CMO in support of the MAGTF mission in order to gain legitimacy, maintain public understanding, good will, and support.
- Directing assigned CA forces in order to support the Future Plans, Future Operations, and Current Operations Integrated Staff Cells (ISCs).
- Recommend CMO related Information Requests (IR) and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) to the G-2.
- Provides the G-2 with information gained from civilians in the AO.
- Provides for limited civil administration of areas under the commanders control.
- Prepares and coordinates Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the OPLAN/OPORD
- Advises the commander on the employment of military units in support of CA programs.
- Assist the G-4 in identifying local goods, services, and facilities available to support military operations to include civilian medical capabilities.
- Assist the G-4 and the medical officer in identifying the basic needs of the civilian population in terms of emergency food, shelter, and health care. Develop programs to satisfy these needs.

- Coordinate with the SJA on the rules of engagement (ROE) as applied to civilians in the AO. Recommend changes to the commander to ensure to the maximum extent permissible civilian personal, cultural, and property rights are safeguarded.
- Coordinate with the Comptroller, Contracting Officer, and SJA the identification, validation, payment, and accounting of claims and vouchers. This may include compensation for death, personal injury, property damage, or and public contractor and vendors.
- Plan and implement, in coordination with PMO and the SJA necessary PRC measures in support of rear area security, law and order, and to minimize civilian interference with combat operations (Such measures may include relocations, curfews, and movement restrictions.)
- Establish and operate a CMOC for the commander in order to maintain liaison and coordinate the operations of OGAs, HN civil authorities, IOs, and NGOs.
- Identify and recommend Protected Targets to G/3 Fires.
- Plan, in coordination with the PAO, public affairs and community relations programs supporting civil affairs goals and objectives. Focus on gaining and maintaining public understanding, goodwill, and support.
- Provide for liaison with CA/CMO elements at higher and adjacent headquarters as required.
- Assist the G-1 with in coordinating local labor resources.
- Recommend Humanitarian and Civil Assistance (HCA) in support of the MAGTF.

### **The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)**

"When the United States undertakes military operations, the U.S. Armed Forces are only one component of a national-level effort involving the various instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military... For example, there is a constant, often urgent need to coordinate the various aspects of the informational instruments of national security strategy: public affairs, psychological operations, and public diplomacy."


*Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*

The major functions of the CMOC include:

- (1) Providing GOs, IOs, NGOs, and PVOs with a single point of contact for civilian populace-related activities and matters. It is a coordination center for receiving and answering requests for MGATF assistance.
- (2) Coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and/or allied commands, UN, HN, and other nonmilitary agencies.

- (3) Provide interface with the U.S. Information Service (USIA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the American Embassy.
- (4) Assisting in the transfer of authority and/or hand off of operations from U.S. military forces to DOS, UN, NATO, HN or other nonmilitary agency control.

*The CMOC is the focal point for coordination and planning between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations. It is not the location at which the CA element plans MAGTF CMO. The CMOC does not establish policy or give direction to the MAGTF, but relays information and recommendations. It is quite possible that more than one CMOC be established in an AO. CA personnel are the primary interface between the MAGTF and other non-military organizations. CA personnel ensure coordination to the highest degree possible. On occasion, the CMOC may be no more than the seats of a tactical vehicle.*




The MAGTF CA staff directs the operation of the CMOC under the guidance of the MAGTF CA Officer. When relationships with civilian organizations require the most senior representation, the commander, a Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, may be designated as the CMOC Director. The CMOC should be staffed with a number of functional representatives from the MAGTF. The CMOC should provide “one-stop shopping” for external organizations. Hours of operation need to be established and posted for the intended users of CMOC. The CMOC must be organized to promote information exchange between participating organizations. Often, this will include facilitating coordination between various external agencies, which otherwise will have no

Availability of facilities may result in CA planning being conducted in the same physical location as an established CMOC, but these are two separate functions.

mechanism for coordination and cooperation. Whenever possible, the MAGTF should help identify civilian capabilities that satisfy civilian requirements, hence avoiding the use of MAGTF resources. Protected targets, population density, demographic, and DC overlays should be maintained and updated in the CMOC. Operation graphics may or may not be appropriate for the CMOC. It is critical that the CMOC provide real value to the organizations meeting there.

## External CMO Interfaces




### The JFC's CA Staff

A regionally oriented CA staff provided by USSOCOM will support the JFC. US Army Civil Affairs Commands will support CinCs. This staff will develop the CinCs' policy for CA Activities, which the MAGTF will then support at the Operational and Tactical levels. The MAGTF CA staff will require a liaison to this staff.

### Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Depending upon the mission, the JFC may consolidate assets capable of performing CMO under a subordinate JTF, a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). With appropriate augmentation, the MAGTF could be assigned the role of JCMOTF. Whenever an element is established

having CMO responsibilities and authority across the JOA, the MAGTF CA section must establish liaison.



### Reachback

Much of the information needed to advise the commander and support CMO planning can be provided to the MAGTF via reachback. This process collects, checks, and deconflicts information from a location in the rear and pushes material forward in a usable format for use in the field. Reachback minimizes the footprint of forces deployed in the AO and takes advantage of substantial information resources not available in the field. It also takes advantage of better communication methods, including face-to-face coordination, between Marines and external organizations that might not be available in an expeditionary environment. Deployed MAGTF CA forces can be supported by the CAGs via reachback. Similarly, CA forces at sea can take advantage of the C4 capabilities of amphibious shipping to push targeted information to CA forces ashore.

### Staff Integration of CMO



“Operations or events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects on other areas and events, therefore the commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. The single-battle concept allows the commander to effectively focus the efforts of all the elements of the force to accomplish the mission.”

- MCWP *Marine Corps Planning Process*

The primary concern for effective CMO is that every Marine consider the civil dimensions the operation. Whenever possible, the assigned CA forces take the lead in facilitating this consideration. Immediately upon assignment, the CA force's priority is staff integration. The following are examples of the functional issues that require coordination with CMO, even when CA personnel are not available to affect it:

#### Supported Commander

The Marine commander establishes the requirement to consider the civil implications of his military mission throughout his command. He actively considers CMO as part of his single-battle concept, driving the planning process to integrate CMO and using civil-military input as part of the decision making process during the course of the battle. He will use CMO to expand the selection of capabilities applied to the mission and minimize the friction that otherwise would slow OpTempo.

#### Personnel

The Personnel section includes CMO considerations as it establishes appropriate standards of conduct for MAGTF personnel in relation to the local civilian population. J-1/G-1, Contracting, and CA personnel will coordinate and develop MAGTF policy regarding the recruitment, hiring, and payment of civilian workers. Military Police operations in the AO should be mutually supportive when integrated with HN security forces.

#### Intelligence

CMO is both a consumer of intelligence and a provider of information. Information of value to the MAGTF commander will be available through the intellectual, operational, experiential, medical and cultural resources found in government agencies, NGOs, commercial interests, academia and across the spectrum of technology. CA forces can facilitate obtaining this information. Typically the Information Requirements of CMO will challenge the Intelligence process, as the process is most often exercised in terms of enemy capabilities and intent. During certain operations, however, intelligence about civil factors may be essential to the commander, such as the identification of key civilian leaders, their support for U.S. operations, and means by which they might be influenced. CA forces must interact with the intelligence cycle, in part by recommending Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR) to the commander. CMO also produces information that must be provided to the Intelligence Cycle. This information will be come part of the commander's personal Situational Awareness. It will also be forwarded to Higher Headquarters,

adding to the common operational picture shared by all elements of the Joint Force.

The Intelligence function must be prepared to provide information or intelligence to a number of civilian agencies. This information will be critical in gaining the cooperation of organizations that have no requirement to accept our direction. Providing information is one of the means by which we demonstrate that working with the MAGTF is to the benefit of the various agencies, thereby gaining their cooperation.

### Counter-Intelligence (CI)

CMO and CI are separate but mutually supporting. CMO provides information that CI personnel use to plan and execute HUMINT operations. CI personnel provide support to the civil-military interface, ensuring that critical information is not made available to any enemy forces. CI participation in the design and operation of the CMOC and of DC camps is of great value in minimizing the risks of exploitation by the enemy. This will be challenging, as the exchange of information between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external agencies will often be important for mission accomplishment. Generally, a complete ban on information exchange will not be acceptable.

The line between CMO and intelligence must be carefully maintained. CMO will be made less effective or impossible if it is seen as a cover for intelligence operations. It also increases the danger to CA personnel, who may be more likely to be targeted if they are perceived as intelligence operatives. Most CI gains will come from conducting periodic and thorough debriefings of personnel involved in CMO.

### Operations

The G/S-3 has staff cognizance over CMO. As with all other MAGTF capabilities, the Operations Officer integrates CMO into the single-battle concept. The civil dimension of the battlespace is constantly changing and can be influenced by ourselves and by our enemies. The Operations Officer ensures that MAGTF operations take maximum advantage of CMO to support mission accomplishment, while minimizing both friction and the negative impact of enemy CMO. It is essential that the MAGTF CA Officer provide concise and considered input to the Commander and the Operations Officer.

The Operations Officer must consider the actions of external organizations in the battlespace, many of them civilian. CA forces can help the Ops officer understand and integrate the intentions of IOs, NGOs, and OGAs primarily through the CMOC.

The commander may establish any staff representative, such as the CA officer, as Principle Staff, especially for particular operations or phases of operations.

## Fires

MAGTF fire support planners and coordinators must consider CMO. CA forces will have input for Fire Support. The Target List contains those targets the commander intends to engage with supporting arms. There may also be a Protected Target (PT) List, consisting of targets requiring special consideration such as religious buildings, schools, or monuments important to the civil populace. The PT List will be published by the JFC and may be directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). It may have Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) implications. CA personnel may also propose PTs to the Fire Support Officer. Measures should be established so that these targets are engaged only when necessary, and with the minimum amount of damage required for mission accomplishment. This may involve defining the types of weapons/munitions that may be used on a target. CA personnel may also sit on the Targeting Board as a check against unnecessary engagement of targets that would inflame civilian opinion against the MAGTF in the AO and potentially around the world. The MAGTF must use caution when targeting infrastructure that will be required for successful transition and redeployment of the MAGTF after the conclusion of hostilities.

## Force Protection (FP)

FP and CMO are also mutually supporting. Effective CMO enhances the legitimacy of MAGTF operations. CMO increases the support civilian populations and organizations provide to the MAGTF and decreases the support civilians might provide to threat forces. CMO helps convince civilian populations to cooperate with MAGTF operations. The local population should understand how U.S. intervention benefits their lives. FP must also support CMO by helping to train CA and other personnel performing CMO by the safest methods to execute their missions. The MAGTF may also need to assist civilian agencies in developing force protection strategies of their own, perhaps even devoting time resources to those agencies whose existence is critical to our success.

## Logistics

There are few MAGTF logistics capabilities that cannot be duplicated and expanded upon by civilian organizations, from water purification to long-haul transport. The critical function the MAGTF brings to CMO is most often command and control, ensuring the effective employment of limited resources in the face of competing demands. When MAGTF assets are used as “muscle”, they should be employed primarily to enable more extensive efforts by external agencies. This facilitation might include efforts such as control of air and seaports, material and cargo handling, or the repair of critical transportation infrastructure. CMO may also facilitate MAGTF access to civilian resources, by identifying sources and providing information on appropriate personal and business practices. This expands the range of operations the commander can support, and enables increased OpTempo. The G/S- 4, in consultation with the MAGTF Surgeon, will also be involved in determining policy for the use of military Health Services capabilities and resources in support of various civilian populations

## Plans

The Plans function falls under the staff cognizance of the G/S-5. The CA staff will support planning by identifying additional requirements for forces to support CMO. The CA staff will also take lead when coordinating with external civilian agencies, especially for the transition of civil responsibilities to civil authorities.

## Communications

MAGTF Communications elements must be prepared to provide communications pathways between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations. Many will be civilian and not have access to military communications. This connectivity will require attention even before operations, as the various agencies begin to coordinate their planning efforts.

## Public Affairs (PA)

Public Affairs and CMO are mutually supportive. Their synergy in the “Information Battle” is one of the key elements of the MAGTF approach to CMO. CMO is an element of the MAGTF story that PA will carry to various audiences, relaying the strategic goals of operation accordingly. PA assets can broadcast and publicize CMO activities.

## Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)

The SJA is the commander’s principle legal advisor. CMO will make substantial demands upon the SJA beyond his usual responsibilities, including the commander’s requirement for assistance with contract and international law issues. At the same time, the SJA’s facility with negotiation can be highly effective when attempting to form consensus between the MAGTF and external organizations and between the various groups and populations themselves. The International Law section of the CAG can support the SJA Subject Matter Experts in a variety of topics to include international contract law.

## Chaplain

Chaplains are of enormous value in CMO, along with their Religious Programs sailors and Marine Chaplain Assistants. The Chaplain’s primary responsibility will be to continue to provide religious ministry support to the Marines and sailors of the MAGTF. Operations such as Peace Enforcement or Humanitarian Assistance are especially challenging for personnel who may be under exceptional stress, faced with great tragedy, and constrained with potentially complicated Rules of Engagement. Chaplains assist the commander to “strengthen the moral and spiritual well-being of personnel under his or her command” in order to “strengthen operational readiness and mission capability”. This support to the commander may be critical, as the actions of individual Marines under great stress may have strategic implications during CMO.

The role of CA and PA capabilities within IO is discussed in JP 3-13 *Information Operations*. Information on the role of chaplains and the Religious Ministry Team is contained in MCWP 6-12 *Religious Ministry Support in the U. S. Marine Corps*.

As a secondary role, chaplains may also provide important support directly to operations. First, their presence among units of the MAGTF demonstrates core US principles to civilians, enhancing the legitimacy of our efforts and gaining cooperation. Second, they may be able to establish channels of communications with civilian religious leaders, supplementing communication and coordination efforts of the commander and his staff. Finally, during certain operations, they may be available to minister directly to civilians, calming them and gaining their cooperation. At no time should the Chaplain's support to civilians be executed without the knowledge and support of the Commander. The Chaplain may be an important source of information to the Commander on the overall attitude of the population.

### Subordinate Units

As the mission requires, subordinate units execute CMO as planned and directed by the MAGTF commander. There will often be a need to provide dedicated CA support to these subordinate units. The MAGTF CA Officer will recommend appropriate employment of CA personnel in order to support the entire force as the situation dictates.

## **The Marine Corps Planning Process and CMO**

The MCPP is a flexible system that supports decisionmaking by the commander and helps to convey his decisions to all members of the force. Depending on the time and staff resources available, it may be quite detailed, or, when time is short, it may be abbreviated. Its tenets are top-down planning, a single battle concept, and integrated planning. CMO must be rigorously considered throughout the MCPP, and not merely "tacked-on" as an afterthought. As specialists tasked to help the commander plan, coordinate, and execute CMO, it is essential CA personnel master the MCPP. As with the other members of the staff, CA Marines must exercise considerable judgment during the MCPP: they must ensure the commander considers critical civil-military concerns, while not over-burdening him with non-essential inputs. When dedicated CA personnel are not available, the commander may identify this as shortfall and request support from higher headquarters. In any case, the commander is still required to consider the civil-military implications of his mission and its accomplishment. The MCPP is organized into (6) steps:

- **Mission Analysis**

The Mission Analysis reviews and analyzes all available information, including orders and guidance from higher headquarters. It drives the remainder of the MCPP, so it is essential that civil considerations be identified at this earliest stage. Mission Analysis begins with the commander's orientation to his situation. Critical CMO inputs will include political, social, and cultural characteristics of the AO. Information from non-military sources, such as NGOs/IOs, OGAs, business and academia will be important. CA personnel support the commander's orientation by gathering information from non-military sources CA Marines will be especially alert for civil considerations identified in guidance from higher headquarters, including

MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning Process* provides extensive information on the MCPP.

restraints and constraints. CA staff will help the commander to identify friendly and enemy centers of gravity. For example, the identification of MAGTF cohesiveness with allies, coalition partners, and the citizens of the Host Nation as a center of gravity drives the staff to the development of operations that protect these sources of strength from enemy misinformation campaigns and our own negative actions. Depending on the mission, civil considerations may help define the operational endstate. The CA staff may begin to determine milestones that will help evaluate the operation, adjusting it as necessary. CA Marines may also recommend Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), elements of information that the commander determines are essential to maintaining situational awareness, making decisions, and developing plans.

During the Mission Analysis process, civil-military factors are considered as the commander and staffs identify specified, implied, and essential tasks as well as constraints and restraints. CA personnel are especially valuable during the identification of implied tasks. Their special focus and experience aid them in planning for civil-military considerations while the remainder of the staff may be focused on threat forces. Similarly, the CA staff may recommend additional constraints and restraints that the commander will apply across the MAGTF. Restraints limit the force's freedom of action, and might include directions to avoid damaging key civilian infrastructure or limiting the type of weapons that may be used in a populated area. Constraints are things the force must do, such as be prepared to conduct DC operations, or provide specified medical attention to civilians under particular conditions.

During Mission Analysis, the CA staff begins development of the CMO Estimate, a summary of all civil-military factors that may effect mission accomplishment. The CMO Estimate supports decisionmaking throughout the planning process and subsequent execution of the operations. It is maintained and continuously refined throughout the operation. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the CMO Estimate may be as informal as an oral briefing or as formal as a detailed written document. The CA staff may identify resource shortfalls during mission analysis. This may include functional specialists, translators, liaisons, or subject matter experts who may be required based on the situation.

The most important product of mission analysis will be the Mission Statement, accompanied by a refined statement of commander's intent and commander's planning guidance. The mission statement is the commander's answer to the fundamental question "What do I want to do?" In operations with a large civil-military component, the mission statement from higher headquarters may allow the MAGTF commander considerable latitude in defining the MAGTF mission statement. For example, the higher mission statement may be phrased as "*Support the Government of...*" or "*Provide Humanitarian Assistance to...*" CA staff work along with other staff sections to refine this guidance and produce a MAGTF mission statement which is achievable and which notifies higher headquarters of the specific limits to MAGTF capabilities and intentions. During combat operations, CMO may be an element of the MAGTF's Shaping Actions, which will set conditions for Decisive Action by enabling MAGTF freedom of action while limiting the enemy.

Once the Mission Statement is written, the MAGTF staff begins to develop Courses of Action that will solve the now clearly stated problem.

- Course of Action (COA) Development

COA development generates options for operations that meet the requirements of the mission, the commander's intent, and the commander's planning guidance. In essence, COA development suggests answers to the commander's question "How do I want to do it?" These options will be compared and weighed to ensure they are suitable, feasible, and complete. After wargaming, the commander will eventually select one COA, potentially with modifications, for further planning and execution. During the development stage, the CA staff must identify COAs that require support. At this point the staff will also begin to consider the Task Organization that will be required to support each COA. During operations that are CMO intensive, such as humanitarian assistance, the commander might explore whether or not the MAGTF will directly accomplish specific functions, or instead concentrate on facilitating the operations of other agencies.

Developed COA are briefed to the commander. This brief may include initial estimates of supportability from subordinate commanders and staff estimates, including those provided by the CA force. The CA staff estimate will briefly summarize the civil-military aspects of the situation that influence each COA and how each COA is vulnerable to enemy efforts. The CMO estimate will identify COA that are supportable or not supportable with regard to assets available and civil-military impact in the AO.

- Course of Action War Game

COA wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each approved COA as it pertains to the enemy and the battlespace. The CMO considerations of each COA are contained within this battlespace evaluation. Dedicated CA staff can be especially valuable in considering the possible actions of civilian populations and organizations, the impact of military forces, and enemy CMO efforts, as wargaming relies heavily on the operational experience and judgment of the commander and his staff. Just as the staff will evaluate each COA against enemy COA, the CA staff must consider the likely civilian actions and reactions to MAGTF operations.

During the course of wargaming, the staff (including CA staff) will record the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, and identify possible branch plans and sequels. For example, a particular COA may identify DC traffic along key lines of communication will disrupt operations. A branch plan will be required to resolve this source of friction. Wargaming might also indicate that certain MAGTF operations are vulnerable to enemy CMO, in that they might be portrayed in a negative light to an undecided civilian population. In this case, the COA might require either modification, or supporting Civil Information or PSYOP efforts. COA wargaming may also indicate requirements for additional communication, coordination, and even liaison with civilian organizations. The COA war game will often result in a refined CA staff estimate of supportability.

- COA Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COA and selects the one he believes will best accomplish the mission. He may also refine his mission statement (including his commanders intent and essential tasks) and identify any branches of the chosen COA for further staff attention. The MAGTF CA officer supports a COA both as a staff officer and as a subordinate commander. As a staff officer, he provides his expertise to indicate which of the various COA is most likely to achieve success with regard to civil-military concerns. As a commander, the CA officer might provide such an estimate in terms of the CA personnel available to support the various COA.

- Orders Development

The orders development step in the MCPP enables the commander to communicate his decisions and intent across the MAGTF. Development includes detailed planning of the basic order as well as necessary annexes and appendixes. Throughout development, it is important to consider that the output will be a product transitioned to commanders and members of the force who may not have participated in the previous Planning Process steps. Therefore, the approved order or plan must contain enough information to guide required actions, while enabling effective decisionmaking as opportunities and threats present themselves during the course of the operation.

The CA staff is typically responsible for preparing Annex G “Civil Affairs” to the order, along with appropriate appendixes. However, it is not sufficient for the MAGTF CA staff to focus solely on Annex G as their participation in the orders development process. Like all other staff elements, CA personnel assist with the orders reconciliation process, ensuring that the basic order and all the annexes and appendixes are both complete and are in agreement. When gaps or discrepancies are found, they must be resolved. The CA staff ensures that CMO concerns are addressed throughout the operations order in such a way that subordinate elements will be properly prepared for whatever situations present themselves during the course of the operation. The orders development process may also include the preparation of branch plans, guiding action to be taken in the event of likely incidents during operations. Once the order is developed, it must be transitioned to the force

- Transition

The transition process provides a shift from planning to execution. It must enhance the situational awareness of those who will execute the order, maintain the intent of the commander’s concept of operations, and promote unity of effort. The transition process may include Transition Briefs, Transition Drills, and or Confirmation Briefs. CA Marines may participate in any or all of these efforts, ensuring that those who will execute the order know and understand the actions they must accomplish.

The title and format for Annex G is prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03A, dated 31 December 1999. The title of the Annex is misleading, as the information it contains may cover all CMO, in addition to the more specialized CA activities or operations.

The equivalent input to a NATO order is generally Annex W, entitled “CIMIC”



The MAGTF CA officer has a dual responsibility during Transition, serving as both a member of the staff and as a commander. In the first case, he must ensure that all elements of the MAGTF are prepared to execute the order. In the second, he must ensure his subordinate CA elements are specifically prepared and equipped for any tasks they are required to execute. Participation of all CA elements in planning is essential. Whenever subordinate CA elements are to be employed, the MAGTF staff officer must work to succeed as a commander, along with his responsibilities as a staff officer.

<b>Marine Corps Planning Process</b> <b>CMO Integration</b>		
<u>Step</u>	<u>CMO Concern</u>	<u>Continuing Actions</u>
<b>Mission Analysis:</b>  <div>---</div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation</li> <li>• Identify Centers of Gravity</li> <li>• Identify Constraints/Restraints</li> <li>• Recommend CMO CCIR</li> <li>• Identify MAGTF and CMO Tasks</li> <li>• Initiate CMO Staff Estimate</li> <li>• Identify Resource Shortfalls</li> <li>• Draft Mission Statement</li> <li>• Present Mission Analysis</li> </ul> <div>---</div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update political, cultural, social considerations. Identify and evaluate external civilian organizations</li> <li>• Analyze/determine Critical Vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Transition across MAGTF</li> <li>• Identify and forward RFIs</li> <li>• Update/Refine - Deliver as Req'd</li> <li>• Forward</li> <li>• Update/Refine</li> </ul> <div>---</div>
<b>COA Development:</b>  <div>---</div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop one or more COA</li> <li>• Brief COA ⇒</li> <li>• Select COA for Wargaming</li> <li>• Develop Commander's Evaluation Criteria ⇒</li> </ul> <div>---</div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness</li> <li>• Consider Task Organization req'd to support</li> <li>• Consider Enemy COA</li> <li>• Initial Estimate of Supportability</li> <li>• Initial CMO Staff Estimate</li> <li>• Impacts of civilians on each COA</li> <li>• Impacts of each COA on civilians</li> <li>• Political/Informational Considerations</li> </ul> <div>---</div>
<div>•</div>	<div>•</div>	<div>•</div>
<b>COA War Game</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• War Game each COA ⇒</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider "What If?"</li> <li>• Record advantages/disadvantages of each COA</li> <li>• Identify additional Tasks</li> <li>• Identify possible Branches and Sequels for planning</li> <li>• Identify tasking for CA elements: e.g.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refine CMO Staff Estimate</li> <li>• Refine CMO Estimate of Supportability</li> </ul>	<b>supported units, liaison req's</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify MAGTF elements requiring CA support</li> </ul>
COA Comparison/ Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recommend COA from CMO perspective</li> <li>• Identify Commander's changes to COA</li> <li>• Support prep of Concept of Ops</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Warning order to CA elements</li> <li>• Identify Branches/Sequels req further development</li> </ul>
Orders Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop Annex G "Civil Affairs"</li> <li>• Reconcile all portions of order</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop Supporting Plans e.g. DC Ops, CMOC Ops, Claims</li> <li>• Develop outline FRAGOs for Branches</li> <li>• Compare with Higher, Adjacent Orders</li> <li>• Identify, correct gaps and deficiencies</li> </ul>
Transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transition from Planners to Executors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>

### Concept of Operations for CMO

The following is a generic plan for CMO support to MAGTF operations. It provides a basis for expansion and adjustment, and may vary depending on the specifics of the operation and the assignment of other forces in the operation. Not every step will apply to every operation. The Marine Corps Planning Process supports accomplishment of each step in the overall CMO plan.

#### Stage 1: Pre-Operation.

1. Begin Information gathering in the AO.
  - Identify and request information required/desired for planning.
  - Explore systems that failed and led to the present operation.
  - Explore systems which succeeded previously and which might be regenerated efficiently.
  - Insert a forward liaison and an analysis element in order to close information requirements.
2. Prepare the force.
  - Educate Marines in the civil-military context of the operation
  - Prepare leaders and individual Marines to make effective decisions
  - Prepare Marines to support Information Operations
3. Establish coordination and communication channels with external civilian organizations.

## **Stage 2: Arrival in the AO.**

1. Perform CMO to support MAGTF deployment.
2. Validate, update, and disseminate CMO Estimate of the Situation.
  - Perform Area Assessments to validate Area Studies.
3. Recommend adjustments to the Force List for forces to support CMO, including CA forces.
4. When appropriate to the mission, perform CMO “Triage”,
  - Identify what is immediately necessary.
  - Accomplish what is immediately possible, enhancing MAGTF legitimacy and therefore Force Protection.
  - Enhance the legitimacy of the Host Nation government.
5. Define specific desired end states and refine plans.
6. Confirm communication and coordination channels
  - a. Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting CMO and CA elements.
  - b. Civilian agencies in the AO.
  - c. Reachback elements

## **Stage 3: Sustainable Operations.**

1. Perform CMO to support the MAGTF.
2. Repair/create social, cultural, or physical (when authorized) infrastructure that will support long term success.
  - Conduct DC Ops: move DC’s to locations where they can be supported by other agencies or move the agencies.
  - Develop civilian capabilities that can assume responsibility for civil concerns after MAGTF redeployment.
  - Do not simply recreate systems that previously existed: they failed and led to the MAGTF’s introduction.
3. Complete planning for transition of responsibilities to external agencies.
4. Enhance the legitimacy of governments and agencies that will provide support after the MAGTF redeploys.
5. Facilitate the repatriation of former combatants.
6. Process claims against the MAGTF.

## **Stage 4: Redeployment.**

1. Perform CMO to support MAGTF redeployment.
2. Transition civil responsibilities to civilian organizations by functional area.

## **Interagency Coordination**

### **The Interagency Process and Participants**

MAGTF operations, both at home and overseas, are increasingly likely to be conducted in an interagency environment. Other government agencies (OGAs), International Organizations (IOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) will often be involved in a crisis before the commitment of the MAGTF. Interagency coordination forges a vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as the power contributed by partners such as nongovernmental agencies. Effective communication and cooperation will enable access to substantial capabilities and resources not typically under MAGTF control. Synchronization of efforts leads to synergy, in which the application of each capability adds to the effectiveness of others. Poor coordination may complicate MAGTF efforts, as different organizations try to achieve incompatible objectives using irreconcilable means. In addition to the Host Nation government, the MAGTF will generally operate alongside three different types of civilian agencies: OGAs, NGOs, and IOs.

- **Other Government Agencies**

Military forces represent only one instrument of national power. Other organizations in the US government are structured and equipped to apply other resources to operations, including diplomatic, economic, informational, and civil policing. Agencies such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) each have roles in both foreign and domestic operations and can add to the assets that a MAGTF applies to a situation. Careful communication and coordination will be required to ensure that the actions of the MAGTF and these agencies are mutually supporting.

- **Nongovernmental Organizations and International Organizations (NGOs and IOs)**

Whether conflict is building or ongoing, NGOs and IOs are likely to be working wherever the MAGTF operates. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs/IOs are frequently on the scene before US forces, are often willing to operate in high-risk areas, and will likely remain long after military forces have departed. Generally speaking, these organizations are guided by three principles as they respond to a humanitarian crisis: humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. NGOs/IOs are flexible, grassroots-focused, and are involved in such diverse activities as education, public health, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. They often refer to their efforts in a crisis as a “response”, much as we refer to an “operation”.

These relief agencies may have substantial resources. The U.S. based NGO “CARE” has applied more than \$350 million a year to programs recently. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can help limit the resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Their extensive and long-term involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations also make these organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments as well as civilian attitudes toward the operation. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide make them key nodes for communication and coordination. They must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

### **Nongovernmental Organizations**

NGOs are voluntary organizations. They are legally different from governmental and international agencies in that they write their own charter and missions. NGOs are funded by private donors, international organizations, and governments. While not answerable to profit-making institutions, they are accountable to their various donors for the resources they require. NGOs vary from established concerns with substantial staffs and budgets, to charities operated by local community organizations. Properly conducted, the relationship between military forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting, but rather an associate or partnership relationship.

Inherent differences between the cultures and organization of military forces and NGOs present challenges to successful cooperation. First, in order to protect their freedom to operate, NGOs are likely to be hesitant to identify too closely with the MAGTF. Collaboration or perceived collaboration with military forces may endanger both the missions of NGOs and the lives of their field staff, especially when a particular response or operation has political or military implications. Second, NGOs often operate without detailed planning. This is a byproduct of their small staffs, limited ability to assess the situation prior to arrival on location, and inability to prejudge the degree to which donors will provide resources for NGOs as the response continues. As a consequence, however, NGOs can also reorient their efforts and assets with great agility. Finally, the MAGTF is often predisposed not to share information, especially about future plans or operations. Cooperation that identifies agreed upon objectives and a clear understanding of what information can and cannot be shared will be of great benefit to all parties.

### **International Organizations**

International Organizations are established by intergovernmental agreements. They operate at the international level and are chartered by organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO). IOs likely to be operating in the field during a crisis include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food Program (WFP). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also an IO, as its role is defined by a number of international treaties. While IOs conduct operations in the field very much like NGOs, they may work in a command and control structure that details their support to a designated civilian agency.

The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) acts as the UN’s interagency coordination and information exchange body among UN humanitarian agencies. It is a valuable node for communication and coordination between NGOs and IOs. Deployed US forces have successfully

At the strategic level, there are a number of coordinating mechanisms that attempt to achieve agreement between agencies at the policy level. In the field, commanders and staffs must devote personal effort and develop effective mechanisms to achieve unity of purpose by developing consensus among the organizations involved. Structurally, the MAGTF will generally find itself participating in interagency operations according to one of the following models:

### **Interagency Coordination for Domestic Operations**

Military operations inside the U.S. and its territories are limited by law and regulation, but may be appropriate when situations require resources that civil capabilities cannot meet. Guidance and direction for the command and control of these operations varies depending on the mission and support to be provided, but generally follows a similar pattern. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) outlines how federal agencies, including the DoD, assist local and state agencies that request assistance when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Additional DoD Directives, Memoranda of Understanding, and agreements provide details for military response for particular missions.

Depending on the type of emergency, a civil command and control focal point for federal response will be established. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibility for coordinating Federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. Acting for the President, FEMA will appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who is responsible for coordinating federal disaster assistance to States and territories. Plans for other emergencies designate a distinct Lead Federal Agency (LFA). For example, the Attorney General is responsible for the management of the Federal response to civil disturbance. In any case, the federal manager may request military resources from the DoD.

The Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for military support involving civil disturbance, acts of terrorism, or other actions with the potential for confrontation with specifically identified individuals and/or groups or will result in the use of lethal force, as well as support which would require the use of forces assigned to the Combatant Commands. In most situations, however, he will designate the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent to implement and oversee domestic military support. The

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used the OCHA web site, [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int) to facilitate interagency coordination efforts in response to several complex emergencies, and numerous conferences and after-action reports have recommended even greater usage.

*Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) –56* establishes U.S. policy for interagency operations overseas and directs the use of several coordinating mechanisms and planning tools to achieve the integration of civil, military, police, and aid functions. While PDD-56 applies formally only to “Complex Contingency Operations”- those short of war- it provides a useful model for adaptation to a variety of interagency operations.

The *Federal Response Plan* is a document signed by 27 Federal departments and agencies, including DoD. It details how Federal assistance is coordinated and delivered in support of State and local governments for disaster or emergency. It serves as a model and supplements other Federal emergency operations plans developed to address specific hazards

Other instructions include DoD Directives 2000.12 *DoD Combating Terrorism Program*, 3025.1 *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, 3025.12 *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances*, 3025.15 *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, and 4000.19 *Interservice and Intragovernment Support*

Director of Military Support (DOMS), established under the Secretary of the Army, plays a key role in the process of responding to requests for military support and providing forces. COMFORSCOM appoints a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), a military official specifically designated to orchestrate DoD support on-scene. Upon assignment, military forces will typically be formed into a JTF or Response Task Force (RTF), often based on a numbered U.S. Army or on a MEF. This Task Force is then placed in support of the FCO or LFA.

### **Interagency Coordination for Foreign Operations**

Operations in foreign areas are conducted to advance US national objectives. For the MAGTF, these operations may stretch from Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs) to Military Operations Other Than War. Because these operations address U.S. national interests, they are likely to involve more than just military instruments of power. Just as in domestic operations, foreign operations will often be interagency operations.

Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementing regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. His civil counterpart in a particular country is the U.S. ambassador, who usually has overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities and personnel in that nation. His authority does not extend to military forces assigned to the combatant commander. He chairs the Country Team, which includes the ranking representatives of embassy sections and other USG agencies operating within a country. Close coordination between the combatant commander and the ambassador and country team is essential and must complement the coordination achieved at the policy level between the various agencies themselves.

Depending upon the situation, the combatant commander and his assigned forces may also have interagency relationships at the operational level that may be similar to the hierarchies established for domestic operations. When the United Nations, NATO, or other international organizations mandate a particular operation, a senior civilian coordinator is often appointed, such as a UN Special Representative. The international community may also designate a lead agency such as the UNHCR or WFP to coordinate the activities of civilian organizations. This lead agency and its partners may operate under legal agreements with host nation governments. In any case, US military forces will need to establish methods of communicating and coordinating with these international structures while also conducting coordination among US agencies at the national level.

### **Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level**

JP 3-07.7 *JTTP for Domestic Support Operations* provides tactics, techniques, and procedures. AJP-9, *NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine* provides guidance for interagency operations when operating within NATO

“The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality.”

-Joint Vision 2020

### **Interagency Relationships.**

To be successful, the interagency process should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. While military organizations may simply direct the actions of subordinate military elements towards the establishment of a declared objective, interagency partners are unlikely to be under the command of the MAGTF, and may not even agree upon the desired goal. In the interagency environment, communication and coordination often replaces command and control. At a minimum, the interagency process should establish and agree to broad objectives and policies which will guide the actions of each of the agencies involved. The organizations must also develop mechanisms to share a “common operational picture”. A mutual appreciation of planned and current operations can de-conflict problems before they begin and may lead to opportunities for mutual support.

Steps for MAGTF commanders that identify mutual objectives and support effective interagency coordination include:

1. Identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation.
2. Identify the resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication of effort and increase coherence in the collective effort.
3. Determine mutually supportable objectives for the operation.
4. Define the desired end state and exit criteria.
5. Define the types of information that can and cannot be exchanged. Establish agreed upon formats for data and develop means to share information useful to everyone.
6. Plan for the transition of responsibilities to agencies with long-term duties and interests.
7. Establish an interagency hierarchy when possible,
8. Solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays.
9. Define courses of action for both military operations and agency activities.
10. Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.
11. Maximize the mission’s assets to support the long term goals of the enterprise.
12. Establish interagency assessment teams.

### **MAGTF as Part of Interagency Operations**

Any MAGTF effort across the spectrum of operations is likely to be an interagency operation in support of U.S. national interest. The relationship between military and civil



authorities is based on mutual trust and confidence. A strong relationship is often the difference between the success and failure of an operation. In the words of General A.C. Zinni, USMC, “Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center.” Communication and coordination complements command and control in the interagency process.

## **Appendix A. References**

- a. DOD Directive 2000.13 “Civil Affairs”
- b. DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities.”
- c. DOD Directive 3025.14, “Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens Abroad”
- d. DOD Directive 3025.15 “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities”
- e. DOD Directive 5100.46, “Foreign Disaster Relief.”
- f. DOD Directive 5525.1, “Status of Forces Policies and Information.”
- g. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War.”
- h. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations.”
- i. Joint Pub 3-07.6 “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance”
- j. Joint Pub 3-07.7 “Domestic Support Operations”
- k. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”
- l. Joint Pub 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.”
- m. Joint Pub 3-57.1 “Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs”
- n. MCWP 6-2 “Command and Control”
- o. FM 27-10, “Law of Land Warfare.”
- p. FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”
- q. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations.”
- r. FM 100-23, “Peace Support Operations.”
- s. DA Pamphlet 27-153, “Procurement Law.”
- t. NWP 9/FMFM 1-10, 1989, “The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.”
- u. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “Handbook for Emergencies.

## **Appendix B. CMO Estimate**

*Coordinating Draft Note:* A joint format for CMO Estimates is being developed in conjunction with the US Army Special Operations Command at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. This format will be included in JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*; and FM 41-10-1, *Tactics Techniques and Procedures for CA*. It will be included in the final version of MCWP 3-33.1, *MAGTF CMO*, and appended to MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

## **Appendix C. MAGTF Civil-Military Operations Report**

Purpose: The MAGTF CMO Report will provide a timely summary of significant civil-military operations in the area of operations and will usually be sent either electronically or via messenger to the next higher CMO level and the unit you are attached to, usually at specific intervals, e.g. a specified time each day. This report is usually unclassified.

### MESSAGE FORMAT:

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

DATE/TIME GROUP:

Line 1: CA/Psyop Team Status (strength, location, unit supporting)

Line 2: Dislocated Civilian (DC) Collection Points, Assembly Area, DC Camps (locations, populations, status of logistical support, critical problems)

Line 3: Uncontrolled DCs (actual or predicted DC movement affecting the tactical situation. Include routes, direction, and estimated number)

Line 4: Status of Local Government Agencies and their Ability to Control/Support Local Population (e.g. civil defense, police, fire, medical, food distribution, judicial, and other agencies)

Line 5: Status of Essential Supplies to Support the Civilian Population

Line 6: Friendly Psyop (effectiveness and vulnerability)

Line 7: Enemy Psyop (effectiveness and vulnerability)

Line 8: Narrative Remarks (significant events, serious incident reports, summary of current status of civil-military operations)

Line 9: Recommendations (the top priority requirements for the next 48 hours)

## Appendix D. Civil-Military Operations Status Report Format for Joint Operations

The CIVMILSTAT message is a joint, preformatted format. It is appropriate for use by any echelon of command, and may be required by Joint Force Commanders. When used within elements of the MAGTF, it may be abbreviated as appropriate to the situation and mission.

TITLE: CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STATUS [CIVMILSTAT]  
REPORT NUMBER: C015 {USMTF # B991}

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to provide a status of the civil affairs and civilian-military cooperation and relations situation. Reference: FM 41-10.

LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME \_\_\_\_\_ (DTG)

LINE 2 – UNIT \_\_\_\_\_ (Unit Making Report)

LINE 3 – LIAISON \_\_\_\_\_ (Establishment of and Changes in Liaison Arrangements Between Civil and Military)

LINE 4 – CONTROL \_\_\_\_\_ (Establishment and Changes in Location, Status, Activity of Control Nodes and in the CMO AO)

LINE 5 – AREA OF OPERATIONS \_\_\_\_\_ (CMO AO Name)

LINE 6 – US CIVILIANS \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of US Civilians in AO)

LINE 7 – THIRD COUNTRY \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Third Country Civilians in AO)

LINE 8 – FOREIGN NATION \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Foreign Nation Civilians in AO)

LINE 9 – TOTAL CIVILIAN POPULATION \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Civilian Population in the AO)

LINE 10 – MALES UNDER 16 \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Males Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 11 – UNACCOMPANIED MALES UNDER 16 \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Unaccompanied Males Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 12 – MALES OVER 60 \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Males Over 60 Years of Age)

LINE 13 – MARRIED MALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Married Males)

LINE 14 – SINGLE MALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Single Males)

LINE 15 – FEMALES UNDER 16 \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Females Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 16 – UNACCOMPANIED FEMALES UNDER 16 \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Unaccompanied Females Under 16 Years of Age)

LINE 17 – FEMALES OVER 60 \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Females Over 60 Years of Age)

LINE 18 – MARRIED FEMALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Married Females)

LINE 19 – SINGLE FEMALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Single Females)

LINE 20 – DISLOCATED MALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Males in AO)

LINE 21 – DISLOCATED FEMALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Females in AO)

LINE 22 – TOTAL MALES AND FEMALES \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Males And Females in AO)

LINE 23 – CONTROLLED \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Civilians in Controlled Movement)

LINE 24 – UNCONTROLLED \_\_\_\_\_ (Total Number of Dislocated Civilians in Uncontrolled Movement)

LINE 25 – MANPOWER \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Civilian Manpower  
Indicate Changes/Shortages in Labor Availability)

LINE 26 – PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Capability to  
Continue Essential Functions)

LINE 27 – LEGAL \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Status of Legal  
Accommodations and Accords)

LINE 28 – INTELLIGENCE \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Civilian Attitude;  
Identification of Collaborators, Agents, and Dissident Elements; Espionage, Sabotage, and Political  
Subversion)

LINE 29 – LAW AND ORDER \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Civilian Law and  
Order)

LINE 30 – PUBLIC HEALTH \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Status of Public  
Health)

LINE 31 – SUPPLY \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Status of Civilian  
Supplies)

LINE 32 – TRANSPORTATION \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Status of the Civil  
Transportation System)

LINE 33 – DRINKING WATER \_\_\_\_\_ (Water Potability Status; Potable,  
Local Only; Nonpotable; to US Standards, as Applicable)

LINE 34 – WATER PRODUCTION \_\_\_\_\_ (Adequacy of the Water  
Production Capability; Adequate, Not Adequate, or None, as Applicable)

LINE 35 – SEWAGE TREATMENT \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of Sewage Treatment;  
Adequate, Not Adequate, or None, as Applicable)

LINE 36 – REFUSE \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of Refuse Collection  
Adequate, Not Adequate, or None as Applicable)

LINE 37 – RADIO \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Radio Capability  
Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 38 – TELEVISION \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Television  
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 39 – NEWSPAPER \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Newspaper  
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 40 – POSTAL \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Postal Capability  
Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 41 – TELEPHONE \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Telephone  
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 42 – TELEGRAPH \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Telegraph  
Capability Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 43 – TELETYPE \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Teletype Capability  
Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 44 – ELECTRIC NAVIGATION SYSTEM \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of the Electric Navigation  
System Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 45 – WORD OF MOUTH \_\_\_\_\_ (Status of Word of Mouth  
Communications Using OPERATIONAL, NONOPERATIONAL, or UNKNOWN)

LINE 46 – EMERGENCY SERVICES \_\_\_\_\_ (Incidents Affecting  
Civilian Community, Critical Events, and Assistance Provided US Forces)

LINE 47 – SHORTAGES \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes or Shortages  
Community (Water Shortages, Quarantines, Road Restrictions, Curfews))

LINE 48 – SUPPORT RECEIVED \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Support Received  
From Civilian Community)

LINE 49 – PSYOP \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Enemy PSYOP  
Actions Targeted at Civilian Community)

LINE 50 – PROTECTED PROPERTY \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Status of Arts,  
Monuments, Archives, and Protected Targets)

LINE 51 – CULTURE \_\_\_\_\_ (Changes in Local Civil, Social,  
Cultural, Religious, and Ethnic Characteristics)

LINE 52 – RECOMMENDATIONS \_\_\_\_\_ (Narrative Summary and  
Recommendations concerning the Status of Civil-Military Operations Activities)



LINE 53 – NARRATIVE \_\_\_\_\_ (Free Text for information  
Required Clarification of Report)

LINE 54 – AUTHENTICATION \_\_\_\_\_ (Report Authentication)

## APPENDIX E. Sample Annex G *CIVIL AFFAIRS*

This Appendix contains a sample ANNEX G, *Civil Affairs* for MAGTF operations. It is generic, and should be adjusted for the particular operations and type of MAGTF supported. It is written IAW format identified in MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning Process* and may be abbreviated or expanded as time and situation permit. Careful attention must be paid to the classification of this Annex and individual paragraphs in order to share this document or appropriate portions with other agencies. Italicized text is suggested for inclusion. Appendixes to Annex G are not mandated by Joint or Marine Corps doctrine, but are used as necessary. The enclosed Appendices are suggested as useful. Updates to the Annex G format and content can be found via the Internet.

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ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)  
(Operation CODEWORD) ( )  
CIVIL AFFAIRS ( )

( ) REFERENCES: Cite references necessary for a complete understanding of this annex.

- (a) [Map]
- (b) [Operations Order]
- (c) [Applicable Op/Con Plan]

#### 1. ( ) Situation

a. ( ) General. Refer to Basic Plan and other annexes, as appropriate. Summarize the situation as it applies to civilian populace in the battlespace and the intentions and capabilities of the government, if any. Do not repeat information contained in the general situation paragraph of the basic operation order or plan or detailed information in the appendices. Emphasize areas affecting displaced persons, government stability and destruction or degradation of civilian infrastructure. Consider the support of the government by the populace, and the probable reaction of the populace towards US intervention. Consider the civil impact of MAGTF operations in the battlespace and elsewhere in the region.

(1) ( ) Establish the legal basis for, and expected scope of, CMO in this operation and include identification of pertinent international and civil-military agreements. *“The MAGTF will meet our legal and moral obligations to the civilian populace in our area of influence. Operations will be planned to cause the minimum suffering for non-combatants and include the maximum humanitarian assistance. It is US policy that operations must meet, and if possible exceed the Rules of Engagement (ROE), laws of warfare, and the Geneva Conventions. “*

(2) ( ) State the purpose of this annex, which normally is to provide instructions for guiding all relationships between the military force and civil organizations, authorities and inhabitants in the operational area. *“This annex with supporting appendices identifies CMO for all phases of the operation, and guides all relationships between the MAGTF and civil authorities, inhabitants, IO’s and NGO’s, and Third Country Nationals (TCN’s). When the MAGTF is employed as an enabling force for larger, follow-on forces, CMO may be directed towards obtaining and reporting an accurate assessment of the current civil-military situation, and creating an information infra-structure to support future CMO.”*

b. ( ) Enemy. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence. Assess the impact of enemy capabilities and probable COA on the civil-military situation, with particular emphasis on identifying requirements for CMO, civil affairs functions and activities. Consider the potential for enemy disruption of MAGTF CMO and the potential for presentation of MAGTF operations to the local and world populace in a negative light. Summarize the expected civil-military situation, including government institutions, customs and attitudes of the population, and availability of indigenous resources. Consider the effects of climate and terrain on CMO. Consider prevailing sociological conditions, including ethnic, religious, language, or cultural tendencies that may present obstacles to effective MAGTF operations and CMO.

c. ( ) Friendly. State the CA functions to be performed by civilian authorities of the US and allied governments in the AO. Identify local indigenous assets available to support and assist in CMO. Identify elements providing staff augmentation and expertise to the MAGTF. State location and capability of Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)/ Civil Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC) if established.

(1) ( ) Identify Unified Commander’s structure which guides CMO, whether J-5, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) or other organization. Restate policy and direction for the conduct of CMO within the AO.

(2) ( ) Identify senior Operational Commander’s structure that guides CMO. This might include Commander Naval Forces when he is the supported commander. Restate mission for the conduct of CMO.

(3) ( ) Consider OGA plans and activities in the battlespace. Consider Department of State (DOS)/ American Embassy (AMEMB) guidance and activities.

DOS/AMEMB provides general information on US and other TCN's in the AO, and provides information on the requirements of international law, agreements, principles, or policies that apply to the MAGTF. This may include SOFA, staging and basing rights, logistical support, purchasing rights, etc. Identify Non- DOS US agencies and personnel with experience in the AO. This may include agencies operating from within the AMEMB, such as FBI, DOJ, NCIS, and USDA.

d. ( ) Assumptions. List the basic assumptions upon which CMO planning is based, with particular attention to enemy COAs, availability of indigenous resources, and conclusion of necessary agreements with foreign governments on US forces. Consider making appropriate assumptions concerning US policy, international and civil-military agreements, enemy COAs, and availability of host-nation resources. Consider making appropriate assumptions about NGO COAs. Consider the need and opportunity to plan and/or to execute CMO during each planned phase of the operation.

2. ( ) Mission. State the mission to be accomplished by CMO in support of the operations envisaged in the Basic Plan. *“On order, conduct CMO in order to support MAGTF operations as identified in the Basic Plan. Enhance MAGTF freedom of action. Prevent civilian interference with the MAGTF’s military mission. Identify and coordinate civilian resources that support our operations. Deny a supportive operational environment to the enemy, especially to asymmetric threats. Be prepared to support Mass Casualty operations and consequence management. Desired endstate typically includes a stable and secure environment permitting redeployment of the MAGTF from the AO and /or a return to amphibious shipping.”*

3. ( ) Execution. CMO ranges from civil-military liaison in the AO to support for a Unified Commander’s assumption of military government or civil administration. The functions may vary within the AO or between phases of the operation. Therefore, this paragraph may require considerable detail and possibly alternative plans. Use appendixes as necessary to provide long or detailed guidance.

a. ( ) Concept of the Operations. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of CMO from beginning to end of the operation. Describe how CMO will support the MAGTF’s operational mission.

1. ( ) Time-phasing of the operation.

2. ( ) The MAGTF is not capable of the execution of civil administration with organic assets. The concept of CMO should include the principle types of CMO to be performed. Consider describing concept for Populace and Resources Control, Foreign Nation Support, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Civic Action, and Domestic Support Operations.

3. ( ) Deployment and employment of assets and elements in support of CMO.

4. ( ) Scope and duration, to include post-conflict operations. Consider describing in terms of Pre-Operation, Immediate, Sustained, and Redeployment efforts.

5. ( ) Clear and concise end states for CMO to describe the successful completion of each phase and COA.

6. ( ) Function and operation of CMOC's/ CIMIC's if established.

b. ( ) Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the MAGTF in separate numbered subparagraphs. Tasks should reflect the Task Organization in the Basic Plan. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed.

1. ( ) *CE: Establish a CMOC/CMIC.*
2. ( ) *GCE: Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Provide security to designated CMO. Be prepared to establish a "911" system for emergency support of designated external agencies and organizations. Be prepared to provide representation to the CMOC when established.*
3. ( ) *ACE: Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Provide representation to the CMOC when established. Be prepared to support MAGTF CMO when directed. Be prepared to support GCE "911" response operations.*
4. ( ) *CSSE: Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Be prepared to support the establishment of the CMOC/CIMIC. Be prepared to provide representation and planning support to the CMOC/CIMIC. Be prepared to conduct Mass Casualty operations. Be prepared to provide Humanitarian Assistance (HA). Be prepared to establish DC camps. Be prepared to support validated requests by the HN, NGOs, and allies for logistics support.*
5. ( ) *Civil Affairs Element: Consider describing in terms of CA Functional Specialties to be performed; Dislocated Civilians, Cultural Relations, Public Safety, Civilian Supply, Civil Information, Legal, Public Health, Public Works and Utilities, Public Communications.*
6. ( ) *PSYOP Element:*
7. ( ) *Military Police Element:*
8. ( ) *Staff Judge Advocate:*
9. ( ) *Public Affairs Officer:*
10. ( ) *Contracting Officer:*
11. ( ) *Environmental Health/USAMRID Element:*
12. ( ) *MAGTF Surgeon:*
13. ( ) *Counter-Intelligence:"*

c. ( ) Coordinating instructions. List the instructions common to two or more elements of 22D MEU. Areas or events requiring coordination include but are not limited to:

1. ( ) Establishment of CMO boundaries.
2. ( ) Liaison arrangements with allied forces and between subordinate commands.

3. ( ) Claims policies, in consonance with Appendix 4 to Annex E.
4. ( ) Liaison and coordination with US Government agencies. This includes coordination of information operations in order to present a consistent message in and out of the AO.
5. ( ) Liaison and coordination with Host Country, or other friendly countries, governments, and NGO's.
6. ( ) PSYOP support to CMO.
7. ( ) *"CMO will be planned centrally and executed locally.*
8. ( ) *Use non-MAGTF resources to support CMO whenever possible.*
9. ( ) *Direction on providing medical support to external agencies and individuals.*
10. ( ) *Units will avoid establishing positions in the vicinity of civilian locations. Under no circumstances allow hostile forces to create an incident which requires you to fire into civilian locations. When the situation demands it, include civilian locations within your defensive scheme of maneuver.*
11. ( ) *Commanders will attempt to coordinate with civilian authorities within their zones, and make every effort to be responsive to their needs.*
12. ( ) *Every effort will be made to interact with civilians through their own authorities.*
13. ( ) *DP routes and camps will be planned to avoid MAGTF high value targets.*
14. ( ) *Establish measures to protect religious, culturally significant, and other specified properties (See Appendix 2).*
15. ( ) *Barrier plans must be approved by CO MAGTF, and will be coordinated with HN government.*
16. ( ) *When CA assets are assigned below the CE, the supported element provides support, to include communications and logistics requirements."*

d. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements. Identify information on friendly, enemy, and civilian activities in the battlespace that the commander deems as critical for the conduct of CMO. Include information that helps maintain situational awareness, plan future activities, and assist in timely and accurate decisionmaking.

1. ( ) *" Report any US or enemy violation of international law by Flash precedence traffic.*
2. ( ) *Report any groups of 50 or more DCs as a SpotRep.*

#### 4. ( ) Administration and Logistics

- a. ( ) Military Resource Requirements . State any applicable requirements to maintain military equipment and supplies for support of CMO. (Refer to Annex D, Logistics.)

- b. ( ) Civilian Personnel. Estimate the local civilian labor required and available to support military operations. (Refer to Annex E, Personnel.) This may often relate to APOD and RSOI operations.
  - c. ( ) Civilian Facilities and Supplies. Estimate the local civilian facilities and supplies required and available to support the operation. (Refer to Annex D, Logistics.)
  - d. ( ) Reports. Establish any necessary administrative reporting requirements.
    1. ( ) *“Report location of CMOC and provide daily CMOC report when established below the CE level.*
    2. ( ) *Locate, record, and report names of potential translators.”*
5. ( ) Command and Control. Indicate the difference, if any, between the command channels for the conduct of CMO and the command relationships established in Annex J. Specify command relationships and logistics of CMO efforts and forces (emphasize difference between efforts and forces). Include any changes or transitions between command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all agreements and MOUs used and those requiring development.
- a. ( ) *“CMO is a command responsibility at all levels.*
  - b. ( ) *The G/S-3 (Operations) Officer (or MAGTF CA Officer ) has staff cognizance over all CA activities and planning.*
  - c. ( ) *The CA Officer is generally located with the Landing Force Operations Center.*
  - d. ( ) *When assigned an operational role, Civil Affairs personnel are generally established in a location that facilitates interface with civilian authorities and has reliable communications with the supported commander. This is usually in the vicinity of the Main CP. CA personnel may also be assigned to the Forward Command Element (FCE) if inserted. They may be assigned to support subordinate elements when appropriate.*
  - e. ( ) *Location of a CMOC is TBD, generally in a location that provides adequate access and security for all parties (civilian and military) while ensuring adequate operational security and force protection.*

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Appendixes:

APPENDIX 1 (INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS)

APPENDIX 2 (PROTECTED TARGET GUIDANCE)

APPENDIX 3 (SOP FOR CMOC OPERATIONS)

APPENDIX 4 (TRANSITION MATRIX)

APPENDIX 5 (FCE OPERATIONS) TBI

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/s/

I. M. OPSO

Rank, U. S. Marine Corps

Operations Officer

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)  
(Operation CODEWORD) ( )  
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS ( )

1. ( ) Availability of US personnel experienced in AO
  - a. ( ) US Law Enforcement/Government- FBI, NCIS, ICPTF, DEA, USAID, OFDA
  - b. ( ) US Business leaders
2. ( ) Civil Authority
  - i. ( ) Perceived Legitimacy of National and Local Police forces by civilian populace.
    1. ( ) By Urban Populace
    2. ( ) By Rural Populace
  - b. ( ) Location of Civil Authority HQ's. Names and method of contact of commanders.
    1. ( ) Local Government
    2. ( ) Police forces
    3. ( ) Fire services
    4. ( ) Hospitals/Medical Services
    5. ( ) Public Works and Sanitation
    6. ( ) Emergency Management Operations Centers
  - c. ( ) Availability of Identity Rosters, photo's. Description or samples of Identification Cards.
  - d. ( ) Attitude of Local Authorities towards US intervention
  - e. ( ) Location of government facilities in AO

- f. ( ) NGO's/IOs Operating in AO
  - 1. ( ) In-country HQ locations, POC's, methods of contact
  - 2. ( ) Worldwide HQ's, POC's, methods of contact.
  - 3. ( ) Missions, capabilities, experience of organizations operating in AO.
  
- g. ( ) Hospitals
  - 1. ( ) Names, Locations, Capacity
  - 2. ( ) Specialties, Adequacy, Condition
  
- h. ( ) Water Supply
  - 1. ( ) Type and location of source
  - 2. ( ) Delivery methods
  - 3. ( ) Treatment plants
  - 4. ( ) Storage facilities
  - 5. ( ) Average consumption by industry, agriculture
  - 6. ( ) Total System, Capacity.
  
- i. ( ) Food Distribution Centers
  - 1. ( ) Location
  - 2. ( ) Projected stocks
  - 3. ( ) Managers/NGO Operators
  
- j. ( ) Engineer/Construction Facilities and Equipment
  - 1. ( ) Location and type
  - 2. ( ) Stocks of construction equipment and materials
  
- k. ( ) Sociological and Cultural Makeup of the populace
  - 1. ( ) Languages/dialects
    - a. ( ) Spoken
    - b. ( ) Written
    - c. ( ) Literacy rate
  - 2. ( ) Customs
  - 3. ( ) Typical diet, prevalent medical concerns

4. ( ) Basic physical condition.
- k. ( ) History of past foreign/US military involvement on AO.
- l. ( ) Existing Treaties, Status of Forces Agreement with US

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)

(Operation CODEWORD) ( )

PROTECTED TARGET GUIDANCE ( )

1. ( ) General.

- a. ( ) This appendix provides guidance for commanders and Fire Support planners to assist in the development of the MAGTF “Protected Targets” list. Protected Targets are those locations that the Law of War deems exempt from fires of combatant forces because of cultural, religious, or population support functions. 22D MEU planners will consider the cultural, economic, political, and informational aspects of all operations.
- b. ( ) Deliberate targeting avoids the following types of facilities due to their cultural, economic, and social significance:
  - 1. ( ) Religious facilities.
  - 2. ( ) Cultural and historic institutions, to include museums, art galleries, and commemorative parks.
  - 3. ( ) Non-military schools.
  - 4. ( ) Hospitals, clinics, and medical treatment and supply facilities.
- c. ( ) MAGTF planners will consider establishing the following as protected targets, due to their population support functions and the potential impact of the their destruction on post-hostility reconstruction:
  - 1. ( ) Water supply facilities.
  - 2. ( ) Electric power generation and control facilities.
  - 3. ( ) Waste water treatment facilities.
- d. ( ) MAGTF planners will consider establishing archival and record keeping facilities such as libraries as protected targets, due to their unique value in reestablishing post-hostility public order and economic stability.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)

(Operation CODEWORD) ( )

CMOC OPERATIONS ( )

( ) REFERENCES:

a. ( ) Relevant Op Order

b. ( ) Maps and overlays

1. ( ) Situation. Virtually any AO the MAGTF operates in will be occupied by civilian inhabitants. It is likely that the AO will be experiencing one or more types of emergencies, and governmental, International, And Non-Governmental Organizations (IO/NGOs) will be present and at work. Without proper coordination, these organizations can interfere, often accidentally with MAGTF operations.

2. ( ) Mission. On order the MAGTF establishes a Civil-Military Operations Center ashore in order to facilitate communication, coordination between the MAGTF and external civilian organizations and populations. Facilitate communications and coordination between civilian organizations in order to minimize the requirements for MAGTF personnel, equipment, and supplies by coordinating and facilitating the usage of non-MAGTF resources. Minimize the use of MAGTF resources to meet civilian requirements, including the demands on the time of commanders and staffs. Maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Assist the MAGTF to meet the commander's legal and moral obligations to civilians in the MAGTF AO

3. ( ) Execution.

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. The CMOC is intended to provide "One-stop shopping" for interface between the MAGTF and civilians.

1. ( ) The term civilian includes:

a. ( ) Other US and allied Government agencies NATO (e.g. USAID, OFDA, FEMA)

b. ( ) HN Security/ Law Enforcement agencies

c. ( ) Host Nation (HN) non-mil agencies (e.g. religious, relief efforts)

d. ( ) HN political bodies (e.g. Governor, Mayor, Emergency Operations Center)

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- e. ( ) International Organizations (IO) (e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC)).
  - f. ( ) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) (e.g. Oxford Famine Relief (OXFAM), Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Doctors Without Borders).
  - g. ( ) Civilian inhabitants of the AO.
2. ( ) The functions the CMOC provides include:
- a. ( ) Validating civilian requests for support from MAGTF including:
    - 1. ( ) Security escort.
    - 2. ( ) C3 support.
    - 3. ( ) Engineer support/ civil engineering.
    - 4. ( ) Provide daily situation and security briefs to civilian agencies (not intended to replace JIB).
    - 5. ( ) Promulgate and explain MAGTF policies to civilian agencies/ HN (Command continues to show personal respect to senior political structures).
    - 6. ( ) Host /convene planning sessions among multiple agencies with differing skills, interests.
    - 7. ( ) Administer and issue identification cards/passes to validated agencies and personnel.
    - 8. ( ) Develop/ promulgate "911" system for response to civilian security contingencies.
    - 9. ( ) Coordinate access to airport, ATC, ramp space, MHE, maintenance facilities and equipment.
    - 10. ( ) Coordinate seaport access, mooring locations, Pilot/Tug support, pier space, cargo handling, MHE assets.
    - 11. ( ) Frequency management.
    - 12. ( ) Validate and process civilian requests for Space-A transport on Mil ACFT/Sea Lift (Pax and cargo).

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### b. ( ) Tasks.

1. (U) CE: Establish CMOC/CMIC.
2. (U) CSSE: Provide required facilities to maintain a 24-hour CMOC.  
Provide logistics and embarkation representatives to facilitate planning.
3. (U) ACE: Be prepared to provide expertise about airfield operations and strategic lift tasking and requirements.
4. (U) GCE: Provide representatives to coordinate security escort for civilian operations.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions: Major Subordinate Elements may establish local CMOCs in zone.

### 4. ( ) Admin and Logistics.

#### a. ( ) Equipment required by priority:

##### 1. ( ) Tentage:

- a. ( ) CP/STICK UP for Ops (1<sup>st</sup> priority for electric power).
- b. (U) GP for Briefing (3d priority for electric power).
- c. (U) 2d CP/ STICK UP for NOFORN Ops (2d priority for electric power).

##### 2. ( ) Communications:

- a. ( ) Wire to supported commander's Op's Center.
- b. ( ) VHF/HF/ Cell phone to assessment personnel.
- c. ( ) POTS telephone (Access to CINC/JTF J-5).
- d. ( ) Fax capability.
- e. ( ) LAN to MAGTF /MarFor Operations Centers.
- f. ( ) LAN/ WAN to AMEMB.
- g. ( ) NIPR/Internet access.
- h. ( ) DSN access.
- i. ( ) STU-III phone.



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3. ( ) Transportation:

- a. ( ) Any 4WD.
- b. ( ) Any M998 (4 seat, High back).
- c. ( ) Civilian vehicle.
- d. ( ) 8+ pax vehicle.

4. ( ) Manning (as available): *(Note: Notional for CMOC ISO a MEU)*

- a. ( ) Director (Policy, Future Ops).
- b. ( ) Dep Director (Next 24 Hrs).
- c. ( ) Ops Chief (Current Ops, Comm guard).
- d. ( ) Admin asst (Security, driver)
- e. ( ) Log planner (Surface/Air transport)

5. ( ) Command and Control.

a. ( ) CMOC Location:

Located in vicinity of MAGTF Operations Center, allowing for simplest coordination. Walking distance best, outside protective wire of Ops Center. Allows use of field wire comm. For HA and NEO MSN's, this may be the CSSE's CSSOC

ii. ( ) Information Management.

a. (U) Asset Matrix

<u>Name of Organization</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Assets</u>	<u>Contact</u>
ICRC	Repatriation	35 Large Lorries, 4 contract Interpreters	Inmarsat
World Food Program	DC Feeding	12 Large Lorries, 120 Tons Wheat Flour	Internet address

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)

(Operation CODEWORD) ( )

TRANSITION MATRIX ( )

( ) REFERENCES:

a. ( ) Relevant Op Order

b. ( ) Maps and overlays

1. The Transition Matrix is a planning and coordination tool. It is primarily useful for communication between the MAGTF and external organizations, and should be designed or modified so that it can be shared among all appropriate agencies. It should usually be posted at the CMOC. The Transition Matrix is a working document: CMO planners should expect that it will require frequent updating and dissemination as operations progress.
2. The Transition Matrix should be prepared to support MAGTF and CMO Concepts of Operations with respect to timelines and responsibilities.

Transition	Week One	Week Two	Week Three	Week Four
<b>Camp Management</b>	USMC/HCR		HCR	
Registration	USMC/HCR			
<b>Shelter</b>				
Tents	USMC	USMC/HCR		HCR/OXFAM
Blankets/Sleeping	USMC	HCR/UNICEF		
Bags				
Cots	USMC	USMC/HCR		HCR/OXFAM
Table/Chairs	USMC	USMC/HCR		HCR/OXFAM
Flooring	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR	
Shower facilities	USMC	USMC/HCR	OXFAM	
<b>Sanitation</b>				
Port-a-John	USMC		HCR/Contractor	
Contracting				
Sanitation/Supplies	USMC		HCR/Contractor	
Contracting				
Preventative Medicine	USMC		UNICEF/NGO	
Training/Education	USMC		UNICEF/NGO	
<b>Water</b>				
Source	USMC		USMC/HCR	
Pumps/Access	USMC		USMC/HCR	
Testing/Training	USMC		USMC/HCR	
Source	USMC/WFP	USMC/WFP	WFP	

		CLASSIFICATION			
Health Services	Education for Recipients	USMC	UNICEF/AICF	AICF/UNICEF	
	Specialized foods		UNICEF/AICF	AICF/UNICEF	
	Providers	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
	Equipment and supplies	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
	Preventative medicine	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
Infrastructure	Training	USMC	USMC/UNICEF		MSF/UNICEF
	Power	USMC	USMC/HCR/GREEN		
	Communications	USMC	USMC/HCR/GREEN		
	Fuel Supply/Dump	USMC		USMC/Contractor	
	Road Improvement	USMC		USMC/WFP/HCR	
Transportation	Warehousing	USMC	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP	
	Vehicles	USMC	USMC/UN/NGO		
	Drivers	USMC	USMC/UN/NGO		
	Maintenance	USMC	USMC/UN/NGO		
	Security convoys	USMC	USMC/GREEN		
Logistics	Supply all classes	USMC	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP/HCR	
	Contracts	USMC	USMC/WFP/HCR		WFP
	Port operations	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP	
	Airport operations	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP	WFP	
Security	Internal Phy/sec	USMC	USMC/HCR		
	Information	USMC	USMC/UN/GREEN		
	S&E Self policing	USMC		USMC/GREEN	
	Convoy	USMC		USMC/GREEN	
	Port operations	USMC		USMC/GREEN/WFP	
Information	Airport operations	USMC		USMC/GREEN/WFP	
	Collecting and Gathering	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR/GREEN	
	Dissemination	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR/GREEN	
	System to address issues	USMC	USMC/HCR	HCR/GREEN	
CMOC					
	Physical premises	USMC	USMC/MNF/UN		
	Comms Infrastructure	USMC	USMC/UN		
	Admin support	USMC	USMC/UN		
	JLC	USMC/WFP/HCR	WFP/HCR/UNICEF		
Education					
	School tents	USMC	UNICEF		
Communications	Psycho-social care	UNICEF			
	Radio	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP/HCR		
	network/connectivity				
Non Food Items	Telecommunication	USMC/UN	USMC/WFP/HCR		
	Cooking utensils	USMC	HCR/UNICEF/NGO		
	Jerry cans	USMC	HCR/UNICEF/NGO		
	Household items	USMC	HCR/UNICEF/NGO		

**Environmental  
Protection**

CLASSIFICATION

**Host Population**

Health	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICE F		
Nutrition	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICE F		
Education	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICE F		
Water/Sanitation	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICE F		
Local Administration support	UN/USMC/ WFP/UNICE F/HCR		

**Contingency  
Planning**

Preparedness profile  
Contingency scenarios  
Program issues  
Response procedures

NOTE: : Green = USMC  
control  
: Yellow = Transition  
: Blue = UN/NGO/HN  
Control

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

M. Y. NAME  
Rank, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

/s/

I.M. OPSO

Rank, U. S. Marine Corps

Operations Officer

## APPENDIX F. CMO Graphics

*Coordinating Draft Note:* CMO graphics are currently under development by the joint CA community, lead by the US Army Special Operations Command at the Special Warfare Center And School. Updated graphics will be provided in the Final Draft of MCWP 3-33.1 as available.




Figure B-1. Sample DC Overlay

## APPENDIX G. Sample language requirements

1. The relationship between the MAGTF and civilian populations and organizations must be enhanced via training and education. The preparation of a pocket-sized language and customs card as shown below can be rapidly prepared and produced, even aboard amphibious shipping in order to reinforce training.

<u>ENGLISH</u>	<u>ALBANIAN</u>	<u>PRONUCIATION</u>
HOW ARE YOU?(M)	Si Je? (F) Si Jeni?	Si JAY/ JAYnee?
HELLO	Tungjatjeta	ToonjAHyehtah
YES/NO	Po/Jo	Poh/Yoh
NOW	Tani	THAN-ee
GOODBYE	Lamtumire;	LahmtoomEER
PLEASE	Ju lutem	yoo IOOtehm
THANK YOU	Ju falem nderit	yoo fAHlehmdndEHree
BATHROOM	Nevojtoe	NAYvoTORay
TO EAT	Ha	HA
TO DRINK	Pi	PEE
FOOD	Ushqim	OOSHkim
THAT WAY	Ande	AN-day
TO THE RIGHT	Djathtas	DYAT-tas
TO THE LEFT	Majtas	MAJ-tas
OUTSIDE	Jashte	YASH-tay
INSIDE	Brenda	BREnda
NORTH	Veri	VAIRee
SOUTH	Jug	Yug
EAST	Lindje	LINDyay
WEST	Perendim	PerENDim
SAFE	Kasaforte	KasahFORTay
FRIEND	Mik	Meek
ENEMY	Armik	ahrmEEk
DOCTOR	Mjek	Myeck
HOSPITAL	Spital	SPEEtal
PISTOL	Revolver	rehvohlveHr
RIFLE	Pushke	pOOshk
MAN	Burre	BOORay
WOMAN	Grua	GROOah
----- (over) -----		
		
RELIGION: 85% MUSLIM 10%GREEK ORTHODOX		
<b>Family/Clan MORE Important</b> than Town/Country/Religion		
NOD OF HEAD <b>UP AND DOWN</b> MEAN'S "NO"		
SHAKING FROM <b>SIDE TO SIDE</b> MEANS "YES"		
<b><u>RULES FOR BEHAVIOR WITH CIVILIANS</u></b>		
DO SMILE!!!!KEEP MILITARY BEARING		
DO treat civilians with respect and dignity		
DO show respect for all religions		
DO shake hands upon meeting and departing		
DO allow civilians to stand within one foot of you		
DO respect their cultures and traditions		
DO NOT turn down a request directly. Suggest you will ask your OIC and try to help		
DO NOT directly disagree about politics or religion		
DO NOT photograph civilians, especially women, without their permission		
DO NOT DISCUSS operational details with civilians, including US media.		